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This paper draws on concepts of trust to analyse recent policies affecting public/third sector relationships, examining the parallel policy strands of competition, 'command and control' mechanisms and the community turn in shaping recent cultures of relationships. The paper draws on examples from two empirical studies in English inner-city areas to explore ways in which power and regulatory frameworks exerted through dominant organisational cultures and arrangements undermine the independent approaches to communication and action, necessary to develop innovative work and organisational learning within and across sectors.State bodies have behaved as though trust in their actions is a given, while increasingly shifting responsibilities for service delivery and risks of failure to others. Drawing on our research, we argue that the increase in market cultures and regulatory frameworks have damaged trust in cross-sector relationships, promoting divisive interests and riskaverse behaviours, restricting the autonomy, innovation and community action presumed in the Big Society agenda. We conclude by highlighting issues that need to be addressed to ensure the development of collaboration with community-based providers in the future including a focus on the processes and relational spaces which will enable positive alternatives.

This paper puts forward a multi-level model, based on system dynamics methodology, to understand the impact of cyber crime on the financial sector. Consistent with recent findings, our results show that strong dynamic relationships, amongst tangible and intangible factors, affect cyber crime cost and occur at different levels of society and value network. Specifically, shifts in financial companies' strategic priorities, having the protection of customer trust and loyalty as a key objective, together with considerations related to market positioning vis-à-vis competitors are important factors in determining the cost of cyber crime. Most of these costs are not driven by the number of cyber crime incidents experienced by financial companies but rather by the way financial companies choose to go about in protecting their business interests and market positioning in the presence of cyber crime. Financial companies' strategic behaviour as response to cyber crime, especially in regard to over-spending on defence measures and chronic under-reporting, has also an important consequence at overall sector and society levels, potentially driving the cost of cyber crime even further upwards. Unwanted consequences, such as weak policing, weak international frameworks for tackling cyber attacks and increases in the jurisdictional arbitrage opportunities for cyber criminals can all increase the cost of cyber crime, while inhibiting integrated and effective measures to address the problem.

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