The New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering (NZSEE) building safety evaluation process was implemented in several earthquakes that occurred as part of the 2010–2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence. This provided an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the current processes across a range of issues. In addition to the established rapid assessments, guidelines have been developed for the detailed engineering evaluation of damaged buildings. Lessons have been drawn from these experiences relating to the effectiveness of placards and the rapid visual assessment of damage, requirements for a full spectrum of assessment processes, and training needs. Improvements to the current building safety evaluation processes are proposed and further considerations for reoccupation of damaged buildings are outlined. While this paper is based on the authors’ experiences in New Zealand, the findings are expected to have wider applications.

Professional engineers have provided a range of inputs into the responses to the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence and the recovery process that has followed. This earthquake sequence has been unique in many respects, including the intensity of shaking produced in the Christchurch CBD by each of the major aftershocks in February, June and December 2011. For engineers, the heavy workload has been continuous from the response to the original 4 September 2010 Darfield earthquake, and will extend for several years to come. There have been many post-earthquake challenges for seismologists and geotechnical and structural engineers, commencing with urban search and rescue responses and rapid building evaluations, and extending through the more detailed assessments and repair specifications during the recovery phase. Engineers are required to interface with owners, regulatory authorities and insurers, and face many challenges in meeting the objectives of these different sectors, which are rarely aligned. Adding to the technical demands has been the requirement for many scientists and engineers to provide input into the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission of Inquiry and other investigations. The Royal Commission was set up to investigate the failure of buildings that led to the loss of 185 lives in the 22 February 2011 aftershock, and has placed close scrutiny on many aspects of engineering activities, particularly those undertaken following the 4 September 2010 earthquake. The prominent public reporting of the Royal Commission hearings has placed additional pressure on many engineers, including those who volunteered their services following the original earthquake into a role for which they had received only limited prior training. Interpreting and communicating ‘safety’ in relation to the re-occupancy (or continued occupancy) of commercial buildings continues to be a challenge in the face of liability concerns. A more comprehensive understanding of the technical and process guidance required by engineers and authorities has resulted from the work undertaken in response to this earthquake sequence. Much of this guidance has now been produced, and will be of considerable benefit for future major earthquake events. This paper reflects on the range of work undertaken by scientists and engineers during the response and recovery stages. The scope and implications of the various official inquiries are summarised, and the potential impacts on engineers involved in the response to and recovery from future major earthquakes are briefly discussed.

This report outlines the observations of an NZSEE team of practitioners and researchers who travelled to the Kumamoto Prefecture of Japan on a reconnaissance visit following the April 2016 earthquakes. The observations presented in this report are focussed on the performance of reinforced concrete (RC) buildings throughout Kumamoto Prefecture. It was found overall that modern RC buildings performed well, with patterns of damage which highlighted a philosophy of designing stiffer buildings with less of an emphasis on ductile behaviour. To explore this important difference in design practice, the Japanese Building Standard Law (BSL) is summarised and compared with standard New Zealand seismic design practices and evaluation methods.

The Mw 7.5 Padang earthquake struck at 17:16 local time on 30th September 2009 with an epicentre offshore about 60 km west-northwest of Padang, capital of West Sumatra Province. More than 1,100 people were killed, and over 2,900 injured. The earthquake caused significant damage to public buildings and offices as well as to about 140,000 houses. It affected 250,000 families through the total or partial loss of their homes and livelihoods. More than half the earthquake fatalities occurred when several villages inland from Pariaman were buried by landslides. However, the damage and destruction of building structures was a major cause behind human and property losses. In addition to landslides, the earthquake triggered extensive liquefaction and lateral spreading in the region. A ten-member team from New Zealand visited the area under the auspices of NZAid and New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering to undertake building safety evaluations. The team spent most of their time in Padang city and other nearby earthquake-affected areas. This paper presents their observations and explores causes behind the damage and destruction of buildings by the moderate to strong earthquake shaking.

A ten-member team of engineers was deployed by NZAID and the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering to assist Indonesian local and provincial agencies with rapid structural assessments of earthquake-affected buildings in and around Padang. This was the first time that a team of New Zealand engineers had been operationally deployed outside the Pacific region following a major earthquake. An accompanying paper describes the earthquake and its impacts, and the general observations of the team. This paper outlines the experiences of a team of 10 New Zealand structural engineers deployed on a volunteer basis for two weeks to undertake the deployment process, the arrangements that the team operated under in Padang, the tasks undertaken and the outputs and outcomes achieved. The lessons for building safety evaluation processes in New Zealand are also presented, along with the resulting enhancements to arrangements.