Six years after the Crimean crisis and the subsequent phase of confrontational dissociation, the first signs of a softening of the hardened fronts are becoming visible. There is a growing realization that the policies of recent years are producing high costs, but are not offering any solutions. Western states dared to take a first step to reduce the level of tensions in summer 2019 with the decision to keep Russia in the Council of Europe. Nevertheless, caution is advisable as phases of détente in Russian-Western relations have regularly been replaced by relapses into confrontation. Against this background, we are developing a new conflict model that sheds new light on the origins of the high tensions in Russian-Western Relations and points to a way to defuse them. In a nutshell, this model maintains that the high tensions resulted from a failed association project -the famous idea of a pan-European peace project whose contours were developed during the early 1990 -and the following dissociation of Russia from this order. However, this model also assumes that a conclusion of the dissociation process creates possibilities for a reduction of tensions. Building on this theoretical assumption, the article explores how the de-facto state of separation achieved in the last years could be transformed into a more codified and stable state of coexistence on the «thinner» basis of norms and institutions.

The Ukraine crisis of 2014 marked the culmination of Russia’s dissociation from the Paris Charter-based European order, and from the global liberal order more generally. Processes of dissociation—defined as intentional distancing from the core rules and norms of institutions—occur relatively often and may even become an increasingly dominant feature of world politics as de-globalization advances. However, this phenomenon has rarely been tackled in academic research. In particular, it remains unclear what the driving forces of dissociation are and whether tensions between “leavers” and “remainers” in this process are destined to increase. This paper aims to address this issue by analyzing the justifications employed by the Russian government in the process of dissociation from the Paris Charter-based European security order before 2014, differentiating between material and ideational dimensions. The study demonstrates how the order that was once seen as a common project was ultimately perceived by Russia as a mechanism of subjugation by the West, which led to Moscow’s departure from it.

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Currently, peptide-based drugs are increasingly replacing dosage forms which have been widely used for many years due to their affinity for living organisms and greater selectivity to biological targets, which lead to a growing demand. To meet that demand, a method using a solid polymer carrier (solid-phase synthesis), which has no alternative for fast and large-scale synthesis, is used. Nevertheless, work on its improvement is carried out non-stop, not only to optimize the chemical process, but also to bring the process to compliance with environmental standards dictated by modern concepts of green chemistry

Russia’s attack on Ukraine has not only shaken the foundations of the European security order, but will also have long-term repercussions on the future of international relations. While Ukraine is enjoying universal backing from Western states, Russia has received at least rhetorical support from its “strategic partner” China. Influential voices have cited this constellation as proof of a new global confrontation between democratic and authoritarian camps. Amidst the current “sea change” in German foreign and defense policy, calls are mounting to make this assumed systemic confrontation its new baseline. In this brief article, we aim to sketch a more complex picture of the Sino-Russian partnership, as revealed by the war in Ukraine. Based on an analysis of Chinese and Russian official statements and expert commentaries published since shortly before the beginning of the war, we find that it is fundamentally shaped by three factors: a partial and short-term overlap of interests, an underdeveloped normative basis further challenged by Russia’s belligerent behavior, and a pronounced reactivity towards US security agency. Accordingly, closer Sino- Russian alignment is not based on ideological fraternity or a symptom of renewed systemic bipolarity in global politics. Viewing it as such is also a bad guideline for practical policy, as it ignores the differences in both countries’ attitudes towards the status quo of global order, and risks pushing them closer together in further challenges against it.