Given the limits of the prevailing hedging account for Seoul’s puzzling behavior that is in conformity with the interests of its adversary (i.e. North Korea) and potential threat (i.e. China) rather than those of its principal ally (i.e. the United States) and security cooperation partner (i.e. Japan), this article emphasizes the impact of the progressive ideology on Seoul’s security policy. In doing so, it calls for attention to a domestic source of ideology in explaining the security behaviors of a secondary state, which is under-researched and thus is poorly understood.

This article seeks to provide a theoretically compelling account for North Korea’s strategic choice to go nuclear and explores its implications for East Asian security. Its main research question is as follows: despite the obvious risks of going nuclear, what makes North Korea so desperate in its pursuit of nuclear capabilities? Contrary to the extant accounts that only emphasize either nonsecurity variables or an “external security” factor, this article conceptualizes North Korea’s security considerations as “regime survival” and explains its strategic choice from it. The central thesis of this article is that North Korea’s decision to go nuclear is a strategic choice, of which the purpose is to achieve its goals of safeguarding independence from external powers as well as ensuring regime security. North Korea pursues nuclear weapons because they not only protect Pyongyang’s regime from foreign aggressions but also help to consolidate Kim Jong-un’s domestic power. North Korea also seeks nuclear weapons in order to safeguard its independence and autonomy from China because the removal of China’s influence is critical to ensuring its regime survival in the long run. North Korea’s strategic choice to go nuclear and its emergence as a de facto nuclear power have significant implications for East Asian security.