We consider a wood forest product supply chain consisting of a forestry company and a wood forest products manufacturer, where the forestry company produces timber and forestry carbon sinks, and the manufacturer consumes timber and carbon emission rights. A Stackelberg model is adopted to investigate the forest scale and carbon emission reduction decisions of the supply chain. We design and analyze the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing (ERCS) mechanism and carbon sink cost-sharing (SCS) mechanism, respectively. The result shows that both contracts can help the wood forest product supply chain to achieve higher profits. The ERCS mechanism may encourage the manufacturer to increase emission reduction level and the forestry company to expand the forest scale. The SCS mechanism is beneficial to the expansion of carbon sink forests; however, it may lead to the manufacturer decreasing investment in carbon emission reduction measures.

We consider a capital constrained timber and carbon sink supply chain under the cap-and-trade scheme, where the forest company produces timber and carbon sink. We consider two subsidy modes: financing subsidy to the carbon sink forests and financing subsidy to the manufacturer’s emission reductions. We apply a Stackelberg model and mainly consider the impact of subsidies on the profits and the strategies of the supply chain members. The results show that when the government gives a financing subsidy to the carbon sink forests, it is conducive to promoting the expansion of carbon sink forests, as well as the enhancement of the forest company’s profit. However, a larger supply of carbon sinks generates a lower price, which leads to the manufacturer reducing the technical emission reduction level and purchasing more carbon emission rights instead. On the other hand, when the manufacturer receives a financing subsidy for the technical emission reduction costs, its production becomes cleaner than before, and the profits of the forest company and the manufacturer increase.