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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether mutual funds (MFs) take positions in companies that subsequently engage in M&As and whether fund managers adjust portfolio holdings in the same direction as wealth creation from mergers. Further, the study is the first to examine the relation between active trading surrounding M&As and risk-adjusted performance in MFs. Design/methodology/approach The sample includes mergers conducted by publicly traded acquirers of public and private targets over 2003–2016. Several measures of MF managerial activeness in M&As are introduced: merger trading intensity (proportional change in fund’s holdings of M&A stocks), active merger weight (deviation of the fund’s actual weights in M&A stocks and value weights) and active merger trading (deviation of the fund’s actual weights in M&A stocks from the average weights in M&A stocks across the funds within the same Center for Research in Security Prices objective). Findings Fund managers who are more vested in the firms engaged in M&As and who are more active in their trades of M&A firms generate higher contemporaneous and subsequent risk-adjusted performance, indicative of managerial skill. Active M&A trading effect on performance is economically meaningful. Originality/value This is the first study to examine whether previously documented predictive power of active institutions regarding M&As’ profitability leads to higher risk-adjusted returns for MF investors. The study introduces several measures to gauge how actively fund managers trade companies engaged in M&As and contributes to the literature on MF managers’ ability to pick stocks.

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PurposeRecent studies explore how chief executive officer (CEO) social capital affects corporate decision-making. Well-connected CEOs can have greater access to information, which can lead to better corporate decisions or permit them to amass power from hierarchy status and make self-serving decisions. This study examines whether investors perceive CEO social capital as a signal of good decision-making (assuming information asymmetry) surrounding asset sell-off events.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use multivariate regression analysis to examine the effect of CEO social capital on the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the asset buyers and sellers. CARs are estimated using a market model in the period proximate to asset sell-off announcements.FindingsThe authors find that CEO social capital is positively associated with announcement returns of the asset sellers. Moreover, the positive effect of CEO social capital on announcement returns is more pronounced for sellers facing greater information asymmetry. An analysis of post-announcement stock performance reveals that the seller CEO social capital is associated with additional value generated for the shareholders of the seller after a month from the announcement date, especially if the transaction price is disclosed. Overall, findings are consistent with the argument that CEO social capital provides value in high information asymmetry environment.Originality/valueTo the authors' knowledge this is the first study to examine the effect of CEO social capital on the shareholders' wealth created by divestitures.

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