This article analyses the experiences of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Colombia, and has two main purposes: first, to elaborate on the relationship between international humanitarian law (IHL) and the practical work of the ICRC in internal armed conflict; and second, to use our enhanced understanding of that relationship to shed light on important questions regarding the nature and effectiveness of IHL with respect to non-State armed groups. It proceeds in three main parts. First, it provides background on the work of the ICRC to contextualise the subsequent analysis, establishing the importance of IHL in the work of the ICRC in general. Second, it shows that for the ICRC, IHL is a means to an end (namely protection) rather than an end in itself, and that it is not the only (or even necessarily the primary) means to that end. Third, it argues that the ICRC often finds that reference to IHL is counter-productive to achieving desired protection outcomes, and that this calls into question the adequacy and effectiveness of the IHL framework itself. Finally, it concludes by suggesting why the existing framework may be less than optimal for achieving its aims, and how future research could contribute to a more comprehensive assessment of the appropriateness and adequacy of existing IHL.

The International Committee of the Red Cross traditionally seeks to protect and assist victims of armed conflict. Over the past 10 years, however, the International Committee of the Red Cross and several other major international humanitarian agencies have turned their attention to situations of urban violence that fall short of the international humanitarian law thresholds for armed conflict. This article examines the institutional consequences of expanding the International Committee of the Red Cross mandate to include urban violence, to make a three-fold argument. First, the incorporation of urban violence into its mandate has led to significant and surprising shifts in the organization’s humanitarian boundaries: from eschewing any effort to prevent or reduce conflict and prioritising neutrality and dialogue with all parties to conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross has begun engaging in violence-prevention and violence-reduction activities, compromising its neutrality and limiting dialogue with some armed groups. Second, because the International Committee of the Red Cross is such an important and influential actor in international humanitarianism, these shifts in its boundaries have the potential to transform definitions of humanitarianism. Third, these shifts may serve to undermine the moral authority of the International Committee of the Red Cross to persuade combatants in international humanitarian law contexts to comply with international humanitarian law, irrespective of the rightness or wrongness of their or their opponents’ goals. Ultimately, then, they may erode the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the laws of war.

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In 2015, Action Contre la Faim launched a campaign calling on the UN to create a new post, that of a Special Rapporteur for the protection of humanitarian aid workers. Critics of the proposal claimed, inter alia, that creating such a post would imply that aid workers were a special category of civilians, worthy of protection over and above that accorded the wider population in the contexts in which they work.1 This raises an important issue which runs deeper than the campaign for a Special Rapporteur. The present article argues that, with or without such a post, the current situation is one in which humanitarian agencies treat aid workers as distinct and separate from the wider civilian population, and take significantly different measures for the safety of their staff from those they take for other civilians. For the most part, the distinction and associated differences are uncritically accepted, and this article sets out to challenge such acceptance by highlighting the nature of the differences, assessing possible explanations for the underlying distinction and considering its implications. Through this analysis, the article argues that this distinction not only reflects but also reinforces an unequal valuing of lives internationally.