PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to discuss the potential impact of measures taken in accordance with powers introduced by Schedule 7 of the Counter‐Terrorism Act 2008 on banks and their customers.Design/methodology/approachThe paper analyses the legal provisions setting out these powers and comments on their scope; discusses the guidance issued with respect to these provisions by the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, as well as other commentary on these provisions; examines the remedies available to those affected by the measures taken in exercise of the Schedule 7 powers; and comments on the use made of these powers to date and the relevant outcomes.FindingsThe paper concludes that while the Schedule 7 powers are useful in permitting a targeted response to money laundering and terrorism financing, they can be needlessly damaging to business unless used in a proportionate and risk‐sensitive manner.Originality/valueThe paper analyses critically the first judicial review decision made in respect of the exercise of Schedule 7 powers.

This article looks at the legal requirements that need to be satisfied in the electronic replication of the bill of lading's functions-in particular, the singularity requirementand at the central registry as a method for satisfying these requirements. It goes on to look at why, a number of years after the BOLERO central registry system was first proposed and set up, electronic equivalents to bills of lading have not come into widespread use in international trade. It explores the reasons behind the failure of the international trade community to adopt these electronic equivalents and identifies some preconditions for progress in this area.

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