This article integrates theory from the cognitive tradition in negotiation with theory on culture and examines cultural influences on cognitive representations of conflict. The authors predicted that although there may be universal (etic) dimensions of conflict construals, there also may be culture-specific (emic) representations of conflict in the United States and Japan. Results of multidimensional scaling analyses of U.S. and Japanese conflict episodes supported this view. Japanese and Americans construed conflicts through a compromise versus win frame (R. L. Pinkley, 1990), providing evidence of a universal dimension of conflict construal. As the authors predicted, Japanese perceived conflicts to be more compromise-focused, as compared with Americans. There were also unique dimensions of construal among Americans and Japanese (infringements to self and giri violations, respectively), suggesting that identical conflict episodes are perceived differently across cultures.

We presented 174 American and 169 Japanese subjects with scenarios in which an actor unintentionally harmed someone. We asked them to rate the likelihood of each of 6 different account tactics and 3 motives of account making. Collectivists (Japanese) were found, compared with individualists (Americans), to show more preference for the mitigating accounts, such as apologies or excuses, but less the assertive accounts, such as justifications. The collectivists’ mitigating style became distinguished, particularly when the participants were in‐group members; and also gender differences were larger among collectivists than among individualists. Harm severity was an independent and powerful determinant of account choice: The causal analysis of the motives revealed that each account tactic was uniquely motivated, and that its supposed motivational process was quite similar between the two cultural groups.

In order to examine the effects of different types of accounts in terms of the victims' reactions, we presented 193 American and 186 Japanese participants with scenarios in which an actor unintentionally harmed someone and then gave one of five different accounts. We asked the participants to estimate how the victim would react (emotional alleviation, impression improvement, or forgiveness) to these accounts. The participants rated that the victims would make more positive reactions to the mitigative accounts (apology or excuse) but more negative reactions to the assertive accounts (the denial). Although the reactions to accounts became generally more negative when the harm was severe, the mitigative accounts were more likely to be accepted by the victim than the assertive ones. As compared with the Japanese, the Americans rated the victim as more increasing their impression improvement reactions to one type of justification but more decreasing it to the denial. However, these results did not match the cultural preference of accounts, thereby casting doubt over the validity of cultural efficacy theory.There are sets of prescribed procedures for resolving social conflicts. Accounts are used in the situations involving harm. A harm-doer attempts to avoid punishment by verbally explaining his or her behavior. A victim appraises the account given by a harm-doer and decides on his or her reactions to the harm-doer (Darby & Schlenker, 1989;Weiner et al., 1991). These reactions may include forgiving or punishing the person. If the victim accepts the account as appropriate, he or she forgives the harm-doer and the conflict is resolved. If not, the victim becomes aggressive and the conflict escalates.Account researchers classified accounts into four types (apology, excuse, justification, and denial) on the basis of the harm-doer's acknowledgment of three cognitive criteria: causal association, outcome harmfulness, and personal responsibility (Itoi et al., 1996;Schoenbach, 1990). In an apology, the harm-doer recognizes both causal association with the event and its harmfulness. Further, the harm-doer socially acknowledges responsibility for the harm done. In an excuse, the harm-doer recognizes both association and harmfulness,

The present study investigated the underlying mechanism yielding a positive correlation between dyad members' mutual liking and meta-accuracy (i.e., dyad members who like each other tend to be accurate in judging how their partner sees them). Two pilot studies were first conducted to confirm the presence of the positive correlation. The main study was conducted to test several possible explanations for the observed positive correlation. In the main study, each participant took part in a series of brief interactions with an unacquainted opposite-sex partner three times. In each interaction, participants rated their liking for the partner, evaluated their impression of the partner on 15 items, and finally inferred the partner's impression of them on the same 15 items. The meta-accuracy was operationally defined as the correlation between the partner's impression and the participant's inference. Neither of the two types of unilateral liking (i.e., participant's liking for the partner nor the partner's liking for the participant) predicted meta-accuracy. However, when both members found the partner likeable (i.e., mutual liking was present), the within-dyad average meta-accuracy tended to be high. The implications of these results for meta-perception research are discussed on the basis of Brunswik's lens model framework. Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Many scholars in divergent disciplines have been intrigued by problems associated with other minds. Epistemologists have been interested in how we become convinced that others feel and think as we do, despite a lack of direct access to other minds (e.g., Churchland, 1988). Developmental psychologists are uncovering the process of young children's acquisition of folk psychology, or theory of mind (e.g., Astington, 1993). Social psychologists, too, have been interested in several problems related to other minds (e.g., Ickes, 2003;Malle, 2004). Ickes and his colleagues have investigated how accurately people can infer their interaction partner's feelings and thoughts (e.g., Ickes, 2003). Other researchers have explored more specific abilities, such as how we are able to discern whether a person is telling a lie (e.g., Ekman, 1985) or how others view us (Kenny & DePaulo, 1993). Judgments of ''how others view us'' are referred to as meta-perceptions, and whether or not people's meta-perceptions are accurate has been studied under the rubric of meta-accuracy (Albright & Malloy, 1999;DePaulo, Kenny, Hoover, Webb, & Oliver, 1987;Kenny & DePaulo, 1993;Levesque, 1997;Malloy, Albright, Kenny, Agatstein, & Winquist, 1997).One might consider that meta-accuracy is related to how successfully we can navigate our complex social world. Burns and Vollmeyer (1998) studied whether one's meta-accuracy (referred to as ''modeling accuracy'' in their paper) is related to one's ability to outwit others in a competitive setting. They had unacquainted dyads engage in 40 trials of a purely competitive task, a zero-sum game. Dyad members' meta-accuracy was assessed three times ...

The purpose of the present study was to examine via a laboratory experiment the effects of two features of electronic negotiation, correctability and exitability, on negotiation processes and outcomes.We define correctability as the negotiator's ability to revise messages before transmitting them to the other party, thus prompting informational and social elaboration.The opportunity to exit the negotiation that the use of the electronic medium creates, a phenomenon for which we have coined the term "exitability, " can give rise to the perception that electronic negotiation is inherently more unstable than face-to-face negotiation. In two experiments, we manipulated the exitability of one of the parties in three ways. In another experiment, we manipulated correctability in two ways.We found that increased exitability caused by the existence of a potential alternative party with whom to negotiate prompted participants to decrease their demands and to reach agreement more often. Increasing the correctability of messages enhanced their clarity and generated more trade-offs, thus leading to more frequent agreements.