This article analyzed the implications of progovernment militias' participation in the counterinsurgency operation in northeast Nigeria. The militias that that has been engaged in the counterinsurgency operation since 2013 appeared influential in the reduction of the Islamist Boko Haram hostilities in the northeast. Prior to the pro-government militia participation, the counterinsurgency campaign of the State is challenged with lackadaisical performances. However, even as the militias are successful, there is still growing fear that the continued engagement of the militias has adverse consequences on the autonomy of the state and the community. This case study, therefore, investigated the implications of the militias' involvement in the counterinsurgency operation in Yobe State of northeast Nigeria. The empirical data collected through the techniques of an in-depth interview, focus group discussion, and on the site non-participatory observation. The primary data was triangulated with secondary data from published materials. The study revealed that in the absence of urgent authoritative action to regularize the militias, they will post imminent threats to the stability of the state and their immediate communities. In addition to the instigation of ethnic polarization, the militia will incubate internal feuds, hence destabilizing the peace situation of the communities. The study recommends the government to take urgent measures to verify the participants and weed bad eggs among them. The government should also provide legal procedures for their operations and recruitment process to curtail abuse and excessiveness.

Since the year 2013, Nigeria’s northeastern region epicenter of the Boko Haram Islamist insurgency waging war for the establishment of an Islamic State has witnessed mass participation of people in a civil militia group. The militia group colloquially describing itself Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) was formed to combat the Boko Haram rebellion. Perhaps, the participation of the CJTF in the combating activities was reportedly influential in reducing the Boko Haram hostilities in most communities. Prior to the CJTF, the counterinsurgency approaches of the Nigerian governments’ Special Joint Task Force and the Multinational Joint Task Force of the Member States of Lake Chad Basin Commission was faced with lackadaisical performances. Whereas the CJTF was reportedly successful, however, the interrupted participation of the people despite the attendant human and material cost has risen suspicion among the population and the critical literature about the groups’ true motivation. This article, therefore, investigated the motivations of the CJTF in northeastern Nigeria. The study was conducted through a qualitative approach designed in a case study. The data was collected from thirteen informants from three groups - CJTF, Community Leaders and State/Local Government authorities. The technique of data collection is in-depth interviews and non-participant observation. The finding revealed personal incentive factors of monetary/material gains, and the futuristic interest of employability drives peoples’ participation. To address the economic interests of the CJTF and as a panacea to prevent the manifestation of the security threats associated with the CJTF group, the study recommends for the establishment of charity centers to receive contributions from well to do citizens to ameliorate the economic needs of the participants. The government should also propound strong legal mechanisms to regulate the activities of the CJTF militia.

Since 2013, the north of Nigeria has witnessed an increased involvement of the militia group ‘Civilian Joint Task Force’ (CJTF) in combating the Islamist insurgent group Boko Haram. The mobilization of the Civilian Joint Task Force brought a tremendous success to the counterinsurgency operation. Before the CJTF’s engagement, the antiterrorism efforts of the government were marred by negligent performance. In addition to helping decrease the attack frequencies and number of fatalities caused by the insurgent group, the militia succeeded in expelling Boko Haram fighters from the towns and villages they had previously occupied. However, the unprecedented participation of the Civilian Joint Task Force in the counterinsurgency campaign has raised certain suspicions of the public in regards to the CJTF’s ulterior motives. This paper, therefore, explores the motives that triggered people’s participation in the Civilian Joint Task Force with the aim to combat the Boko Haram insurgent group. The current paper is a qualitative research, designed as a case study. The empirical data were collected by means of an in-depth interview involving 13 respondents, among who were the members of the CJTF, community leaders and government officials in Yobe State, Nigeria. The findings show that people’s participation in the CJTF is voluntary, with the main motivation being the necessity to defend the community due to the state’s failure to provide adequate protection. The article points out an urgent need to demobilize and deradicalize the participants in order to prevent the CJTF from further jeopardizing local communities’ peace and stability.

This concept paper analyzed the existing counterinsurgency approaches of Nigeria government in combating an Islamist insurgent Boko Haram in Nigeria. Boko Haram violent armed uprising for the Islamization of Nigeria state in 2009 have cooled bloodily murdered thousands of people and displaced millions of others from their settlements. This has resulted in serious humanitarian situations. To combat the insurgency Nigeria government in collaboration and support of foreign government have adopted numerous counterinsurgency measures. However, despite the consistent counterinsurgency measures, prevailing evidence suggests that the insurgency is far away from being defeated. In contrast, the group sustained its violence attacks unabatedly. Therefore, this paper explored that the sustenance of Boko Haram insurgency in spite of the successive counterinsurgency measures eventuated from the adoption of enemy-centric approach in the combating activities. The paper revealed the repressive military action coupled with draconian laws and policies by the state created public dissension toward the counterinsurgency campaign, therefore, undermine the successes of the campaign. In conclusion, the paper recommends that to effectively tackle the Boko Haram insurgency, Nigeria government need to deviate from the enemy-centric approach and to the population-centric paradigm that should focus on addressing the socioeconomic factors fuelling the insurgent recruitment and support.

Since 2013, the northern region of Nigeria has witnessed the unprecedented mobilization of militia group Civilian Joint Task Force to aid combating the Islamic fundamentalist Boko Haram. The participation of the militia was reportedly successful in routing the insurgent. Before the CJTF, Boko Haram defied most of the counterinsurgency measures of the government including the military and the political approaches. However, despite the successes of the CJTF, the strategy that influences the successes was not adequately known. This article, therefore, investigated the strategy of the CJTF that influences its successes. The study was conducted using a qualitative method designed in a case study. Data were collected from thirteen informants through in-depth interviews supported by non-participant observation. The finding shows that CJTF is a kind of informal self-defense group that emerged in response to the inadequate protections by the State. The combating successes of the group were influenced by the information-centric approach of its campaign. Careful intelligence gathering and procession along with the sociocultural linkage of the participants and in-depth knowledge over the physical terrain emerged influential to the groups’ combating. The article recommended that the Nigerian government should re-strategize its existing conventional counterinsurgency approach to adapt to the population-centric paradigm. The government should also adopt palliative measures of promoting sustainable counter-insurgency that should focus on inclusive governance, accountability, and addressing socio-economic issues of poverty and unemployment with all levels of seriousness rather than sticking to the security-only campaign.