In recent years it has become increasingly difficult to maintain that the European party systems are stable and that they reflect the societal cleavage structures of the past. One developmental aspect of the party systems is singled out for description and analysis in this paper. It is argued that European party systems in terms of electoral volatility, i.e. rates of net change in the electorates, are drifting away from each other. Some of the party systems which have traditionally been considered volatile, apparently are becoming less so, while some other systems are taking on the character of highly volatile party systems. A simple set of hypotheses, based upon the notion of party space, is proposed in order to account for the variation observed. The data lend support to the hypothesis that electoral volatility is a function of the format of the party system and of short‐term changes in that format.

Minor and new parties tend to be forgotten by analysts of parties and party systems. Good as well as bad reasons account for this neglect. The neglect ought, however, to be remedied, since it can be argued that minor. and especially new minor. parties play an important role in the transformation of party systems.On the basis of a 'broad' definition of the concept of political party it is suggested that it is worthwhile to look upon parties as mortal organizations bounded by a lifespan. The lifespan of a party can be described by means of four threshold concepts, and it is further argued that lifespan curves can be studied in terms of their modality, dispersion, flatness, and skewness.parties and of party lifespans may be generated from this approach.A number of questions are derived from these concepts. A new typology of minor 72-73).

Everywhere a disparity can be observed between the socioeconomic composition of the electorate and the composition of the elected, representative body, which acts as a legislature for the society. Microcosm and macro- cosm are never identical; the legislature never mirrors the population at large. This is a universal generalization. It holds true for all representative systems at all times. It is furthermore true that the character of this disparity differs cross-nationally and over time: each legislature is unique in this sense.

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