We find that in contrast to the stock market, which performs better during Democratic presidencies, "sin" stocks-publicly traded producers of tobacco, alcohol, and gaming-perform

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The development of organic agriculture in Bangladesh has been slow. According to the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (2018), approximately 12,000 farmers in Bangladesh produce organic crops on around 7,000 hectares of land. The transition from conventional to organic farming has been an issue of debate, especially in the context of developing nations such as Bangladesh. The debate stresses the urgency for the transition to preserve environment and health and to ensure a safe, sustainable and environmentally friendly food production system, but also emphasizes the pressure of maintaining food production for a large growing population. We focus on the debate in the context of Bangladesh, and question whether it is the proper time and stage in the development process to attempt the transition from conventional to organic food production systems. We ask why the organic rice market is not expanding in Bangladesh and explain the slow market growth through the two main factors of income constraint and lack of awareness among people about the environmental and health detriments of non-organic farming. The exploratory study finds that it is not mainly the lack of awareness but the income constraint that can be principally attributed to the slow expansion of the organic rice market in Bangladesh. Through exploring consumers' awareness about organic farming methods and their demand for organic products, this study shows how income as a major constraint, besides price, affects consumers demand for organic and non-organic rice in Bangladesh. Income being identified as the major barrier reveals the potential of the organic rice market to grow in the future, as Bangladesh continues its journey towards becoming a middle-income country.

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This study examines whether the celebrity or star status of a chief executive officer (CEO) affects the informativeness of his insider trades. Using three different measures to identify star CEOs in a sample of S&P 1500 firms, we find that trades of non-star CEOs predict future abnormal returns and earnings innovations and that trades of star CEOs do not. The predictive power of non-star CEO trades is mostly attributable to opportunistic trades, not routine trades.We also find evidence suggesting that the abnormal returns associated with non-star CEO insider trades are due to the lower visibility and consequently less scrutiny of non-star CEOs compared with star CEOs. K E Y W O R D S chief executive officer, insider trading, opportunistic trade, routine trade, star J E L C L A S S I F I C AT I O N G14, G23, G29 INTRODUCTIONDoes the celebrity or star status of a chief executive officer (CEO) matter for the informational content and predictive power of his trades? The informational role of insider trading is not without debate. Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012) find that trades by non-senior insiders [insiders other than CEOs or chief financial officers (CFOs)] can predict future firm events better than trades by senior insiders. Wang, Shin, and Francis (2012) show that CFOs earn higher abnormal returns following their purchases of company shares than CEOs. Knewtson and Nofsinger (2014) find that because CEOs face more scrutiny than CFOs, CEOs limit their trading aggressiveness and their trades are less informative than trades of CFOs. Meanwhile, Ozkan and Trzeciakiewicz (2014) show that CEOs tend to purchase their own company shares more than CFOs do and that CEO purchases are more informative than those of CFOs. In this study, we focus only on CEOs and investigate whether the celebrity or star status of a CEO reveals the information content in his trading. SABHERWAL AND UDDINCEOs. Print and electronic media dedicate multiple issues to star CEOs, their success stories, and even their lifestyles.While existing literature attempts to identify whether star CEOs create more value for their firms and consequently for investors, no study has determined whether star CEOs offer superior information in trades that can be exploited by investors to create value for themselves. We attempt to do so by first arguing the opposite. Specifically, we first argue that the trades of non-star CEOs are likely to have informational content, and then examine whether the empirical evidence supports this argument.Insider trading by a CEO may reflect his private information or his liquidity needs, or both. Therefore, not all CEO trades are necessarily informed. Cohen et al. (2012) classify insider trades into two types: routine trades and opportunistic trades. Routine trades are usually motivated by liquidity needs (when insiders sell shares to finance consumption) or excess liquidity (when insiders receive a bonus and use it to buy shares), and opportunistic trades contain useful private information. We predict that trades by star CEOs (C...