The persistence of tensions in Iran—Saudi Arabia relations is the result of negative emotional predispositions that have formed the identities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia vis‐à‐vis each other. The national component of the Iranian identity enforces disinclination towards Saudi Arabia, whereas its religious component is mired in a feeling of pain inherited from mistreatment that the Shi’a have tolerated throughout history. This pain translates into resentment against Saudi Arabia, a state seen as oppressing Shi’a populations. This is aggravated by the feeling of being humiliated by the western powers, with Iran’s emotional perception of Saudi Arabia becoming more negative due to close cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the Western great powers. Saudi identity also inherits Arabism’s reluctance to accept Iran. As a result, both countries live in an atmosphere of mutual mistrust and fear that explains the persistence of tensions in their relations.

The interim nuclear agreement between Iran and the United States (under Iran‐P5 + 1 umbrella) in November 2013 revived attention to the problem of the Iran‐U.S. conflict and its resolution. The key issues to understand are: first, the reasons for the start of nuclear dispute resolution between Iran and the United States despite failure of all the past reconciliation initiatives; and second, the agreement's implications for overall conflict resolution between the two countries. Relying on the “ripeness theory” and its development in response to criticisms, the central argument of the article is that the start of direct negotiations and efforts of Iran and the United States to reach agreement over the nuclear dispute is due to ripeness of the overall Iran‐U.S. conflict as a result of a nuclear “asymmetric hurting stalemate.” Explaining the factors that disrupt normalization of relations under conditions of ripeness, the article presents four scenarios for the future of Iran‐U.S. relations.

With its enormous natural and human resources, a growing economy and adjacency to Iran’s security and strategic environment, India is considered one of the most important options with which the Islamic Republic of Iran can establish stable and reliable, if not strategic, relations. Despite this, all economic, trade and cultural capacities as well as diplomatic initiatives have not elevated the mutual relations higher than ‘cordial and friendly’. The present article discusses the reasons behind Indo-Iranian failure to create a once desired strategic partnership. The main idea is that differences in the direction and objectives of the relations between Iran and India, that is, balancing the United States for the former and cooperation with Iran besides the United States for the latter, have led to failure of the efforts to establish a strategic partnership. The theory of soft-balancing is used to analyse Iran–India relations when United States as a factor affecting bilateral relations is concerned.

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