No abstract

In process of flood risk management, there is usually conflict between the governments, insurance companies and people as players in sharing financial responsibilities, because of how calculate insurance premium, compensation and governmental assistances. In order to this conflict resolution, in this paper a new methodology is proposed based on game theoretic approach by using Nash equilibrium method, that for the first time, the payoff functions of insurance companies and government have been associated to each other. In this method, according to maximization of player's payoffs, the best response has been found and for the first time, comprehensive financial model has been developed for sharing players' financial responsibilities in flood risk management plans. In order to increase the accuracy of flood insurance calculations, the parameters of deductible and franchise have been applied. The key findings indicate, success of flood risk management plans depend on purchasing flood insurance with full coverage and government financial assistances simultaneously. The developed flood insurance plan has most sensitivity to parameters of deductible and insurance rate. This model could be utilized as practical and academic model in flood risk management. The applicability and efficiency of the methodology are examined in Northeast of Tehran as capital of Iran.