Most researchers interested in the relationship between global markets and public policy focus on advanced industrial democracies. In contrast, we examine competing hypotheses as to globalization's effect on governments by expanding the scope of the discussion to include developing nations. More specifically, we investigate the relationship between international market integration and the evolving burden of taxation on capital, as well as the subsequent response of markets to shifts in tax policy in Latin America since the late 1970s. Consistent with our theoretical expectations, we find that global market forces are more constraining vis-à-vis tax policy in Latin America than in the world's wealthiest nations. Despite these market-based pressures, however, national politics continue to influence tax policy in Latin America in a manner consistent with findings on advanced industrial democracies. As such, developing nations continue to have some room to manipulate policy, though within the context of a more strictly neoliberal context than their counterparts in advanced industrial democracies.

Existing studies hold that Latin America's market turn has had a demobilizing effect on collective political activity despite the presence of democracy. However, recent work has documented the revival of protest in the region, emphasizing the repoliticization of collective actors in the wake of economic liberalization, especially when democracy is present. This article expands the theoretical scope of the repoliticization perspective, providing the most comprehensive test of the demobilization and repoliticization hypotheses to date. Using time-series data from seventeen Latin American countries, the article confirms the repoliticization view by showing that protest increases with economic liberalization in democratic settings.

Using monthly presidential approval data for the period between 1985 and 1997 for two presidencies, I analyze the impact of political violence on presidential approval in Peru. While controlling for variables commonly used in the economic voting literature, the results suggest that higher levels of political violence hurt left-leaning governments, but not necessarily right-leaning governments. It is likely that voters expect right-leaning governments to deal better with political violence in general and thus are more supportive of their efforts.

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Existing literature emphasizes the disorganizing or weakening effects of economic liberalization on civil society, whereby free-market policies are said to demobilize and depoliticize collective actors. The article evaluates the effects of economic liberalization on large-scale societal mobilizations across seventeen Latin American countries for the period 1970–2000. The article further tests the effects of economic liberalization on individual political participation across sixteen Latin American countries for the period 1980–2000. In contrast to the atomization literature, this article provides strong evidence that economic liberalization leads to greater levels of societal mobilization in the context of free-market democratization. The article also demonstrates that economic liberalization does not induce a decline in political participation. Collectively, these results cast doubt on the theoretical underpinnings and empirical findings presented in Kurtz (2004).