The European Union (EU) faced high risks from personal data proliferation to individuals’ privacy. Legislation has emerged that seeks to articulate all interests at stake, balancing the need for data flow from EU countries with protecting personal data: the General Data Protection Regulation. One of the mechanisms established by this new law to strengthen the individual’s control over their data is the so-called “right to be forgotten”, the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of records. In gender transition, this right represents a powerful form of control over personal data, especially health data that may reveal a gender with which they do not identify and reject. Therefore, it is pertinent to discern whether the right to have personal data deleted—in particular, health data—is ethically acceptable in gender transition. Towards addressing the ethical dimensions of the right to be forgotten in this case, this study presents relevant concepts, briefly outlines history, ethics and law of records considering the evolution from paper to electronic format, the main aspects of identity construction and gender identity, and explores the relationship between privacy, data protection/information control and identity projection. Also, it discusses in gender transition the relation between “the right to self-determination”, “the right to delete”, and “the right to identity and individuality”. Conclusions on the ethical admissibility of the ‘right to be forgotten’ to control gender-affirming information are presented.

Recent studies highlight the importance of digital surveillance to gather individual health information due to the global pandemic caused by the new COVID-19 disease. This paper analyses its legal and ethical implications at the interface between the individual right to privacy and the collective interests of public health. We framed the discussion in law, deontology and utilitarianism. The lasted theories and human rights, especially privacy, are crucial in our argument. Health-derived dilemmas and efforts to solve them, especially by information technologies, bioethics and law, exist at these perspectives' interface. In particular, we analysed the intersection between autonomy, the right to privacy, and the so-called 'right to be forgotten' in the public health context. In other words, we studied the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of health data -a radical means of control over personal data established in Article 17 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Given the lack of specifics regarding collection and re-use of such data under the broad scope of public health purposes, implied consent does not address the issue of proportionality. We highlight legal safeguards' insufficiency, suggesting applying the 'right to be forgotten' according to an ethical interpretation.

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The anonymity of gamete donors in the context of medically-assisted reproduction techniques (ART) and the right of the offspring to know their genetic or biological parents' identity is a controversial and widely debated topic in the scientific literature. The positions on the issue in each country are different. Sometimes they are in opposition to each other even in countries with strong similarities, such as those in the European Union (EU), in the framework of shared ethical values. Although some countries still enshrine the rule of anonymity, there is an undeniable tendency to guarantee the right to know one's origins by creating relevant exceptions or abolishing donor anonymity status altogether. This article offers ethical and legal considerations of whether the so-called 'right to be forgotten' (RTBF) could be extended to include gamete donors' right to remain anonymous. This perspective goes against the general trend, certainly in Europe, of recognizing that offspring born from donor gametes have a right to access information relating to their genetic progenitors. The novel addition is to question whether the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) might provide fertile ground for questioning this approach, and effectively support those jurisdictions where anonymity is still possible.

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