The purpose of this article is to understand the EU/UK security relationship after Brexit and the institutional form(s) it may take. Taking stock of the literature on the consequences of Brexit for European foreign affairs, this article employs a question-driven approach to examine uncertainties regarding the future EU/UK security relationship. These questions relate in particular to the United Kingdom’s commitment to European security after Brexit, the nature of post-Brexit developments within the Union, and the European Union’s willingness to afford the United Kingdom a substantial role after withdrawal. This article examines each of these questions in turn, before considering the viability of three frequently mooted institutional arrangements post-Brexit: UK participation in the CSDP as a third country; increased engagement with NATO that becomes the main platform for cooperation between the United Kingdom and the European Union; and the enhancement of bilateral ties between the United Kingdom and key European allies – especially France.

The article and the special section aim to discuss and contextualise the recent rise of traditional aspects of geopolitics in EU foreign policy with a focus on the region on its eastern borders (that the EU has identified as its Eastern Neighbourhood) and Russia. Contributions evaluate the way recent events in the international arena (such as the Ukraine crisis, the Arab Spring or the rise of ISIS) have emphasised the need for the EU to engage with traditional aspects of geopolitics and strategic thinking in foreign policy. While, an initial reading of the EU's recent development and behaviour in the Eastern Neighbourhood might point to the increasingly salience of traditional geopolitical considerations, the articles in the collection highlight that the hybrid nature of the EU also translates into its approach to geopolitics. Acknowledging that elements of traditional geopolitics are salient forces in world politics adds to the EU's hybrid approach and has made it reframe its search for authenticity CONTACT Cristian Nitoiu

The aim of this paper is to shed light on the way the European Parliament's diplomacy affects EU power, particularly during times of crisis. The analysis is focused on the Cox–Kwasniewski mission that the Parliament sent to Ukraine in 2012–13. Based on interviews and existing literature, we discuss the genesis and the development of the mission and then evaluate its impact. We argue that the mission with time became a key diplomatic instrument and enabled EU power projection by giving momentum to the promotion of the EU's approach towards Ukraine, which was already wavering due to the deadlock over the Association Agreement between Kyiv and Brussels and then due to President Yanukovych's refusal to sign the agreement.

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Both the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU) have significant incentives for close collaboration in foreign, security and defence policies, given their shared strategic interests, the clear potential for efficiency savings in working together, and the intensity of prior working relations. That the recently negotiated EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement contains no provisions in this area is thus puzzling for followers of European security, who predicted prompt agreement, and for theories of international cooperation, which emphasise the importance of shared threats, absolute gains and prior interaction. We argue the failure to reach such an agreement stemmed from the politics of the withdrawal process itself, which resulted in acute problems of institutional selectivity, negotiating dynamics that polarised the relationship, institutional change that made an agreement less likely, and distributional scrabbling to supplant the UK. Our findings show that the dynamics of moving away from existing forms of cooperation are highly distinct from those motivating cooperation in normal times.