This article examines the distinctiveness of Brazil, India and China in international regulatory governance by asking whether the European Union (EU)’s dedicated antitrust agreements (ATAs) with Brazil, India and China (BICs) differ significantly from the EU’s other ATAs, and whether observable differences are attributable to these emergent powers’ increased influence in global regulatory governance. We address these questions through a multi-method comparative analysis, using an original dataset of international ATAs. These bilateral inter- and trans-governmental agreements seek to avoid or ameliorate conflicts and establish cooperation between government agencies responsible for competition law and policy. Our quantitative and qualitative analyses both point to a striking ability of the BICs (and Russia) to insist on quite distinctive agreements with regard to both what is covered by these agreements and how any mutual commitments to conflict resolution and regulatory cooperation are articulated. This finding is based on various overall metrics and a computer-assisted comparative textual analysis of all dedicated ATAs to which the EU is a signatory, using inter alia plagiarism detection software, complemented by qualitative content analyses of the agreements and information drawn from interviews with regulatory officials, to gain a better understanding of similarities and differences between the agreements and thus address in more detail the question how unique the BICs are in their ability to pursue distinctive regulatory objectives in the realm of competition law and policy. We conclude that the distinctiveness of the BIC R agreements is indeed indicative of these emergent economies’ increased power in global economic governance—and, more tentatively, that the increased influence of Brazil, China, and India in global regulatory governance is unlikely to be fully matched by other developing countries.

When rapid economic growth catapults a country within a few years from the margins of the global economy to middle power status, does global regulatory governance need to brace for a challenge to the status quo? To answer this question, we extend the power transition theory of global economic governance to middle powers: A rising middle power should be expected to challenge the international regulatory status quo only if increasing issue-specific strength of its regulatory state coincides with preferences that diverge from the preferences of the established powers, which are enshrined in the status quo. We examine this argument empirically, focusing on South Korea in the realm of competition law and policy. We find that South Korea, a non-participant in the international competition regime until the 1980s, developed in the 1990s substantial regulatory capacity and capability and thus "spoiler potential." At the same time, however, its policy preferences converged upon the norms and practices established by the United States and the European Union, albeit with some distinct elements. Under these conditions, we expect a transition from rule-taker to rule-promoter. We find that South Korea has indeed in recent years begun to actively promote well-established competition law and policy norms and practicessupplemented by its distinct elementsthrough technical assistance programs, as well as various bilateral channels and multilateral institutions. The findings suggest that the power transition theory of global economic governance is usefully applicable to middle powers, too.