We study the value of stock liquidity in the market for corporate control and show that the target firm's liquidity has an impact on the transaction itself as well as on the resulting merged entity.We use a sample of US M&A transactions 1987 through 2007 to show that acquiring a more liquid firm makes the stock of the acquirer more liquid. This has consequences on M&A activity and pricing. Public acquirers are more likely than private acquirers to acquire more liquid targets. It also translates into a greater likelihood of completing the deal and higher compensation for the target. 13 (2000), 841-882. Betton, S.; Eckbo, B. E.; Thompson, R.; and K.S. Thorburn. "Merger Negotiations with Stock Market Feedback." Journal of Finance, (forthcoming). Bharath, S.T.; P. Pasquariello; and G. Wu. "Does Asymmetric Information Drive Capital Structure Decisions?"

Bidders have an incentive to pay with stock when their shares are overvalued, but target firms should be reluctant to accept such overvalued payment. In a sample of 2,978 acquisitions, we find that stock payment is readily accepted only when the bidder can justify the financing decision in terms of such economic fundamentals as optimal capital structure. Yet even when the fundamentals justify stock payment, paying with cash is common. In that way, firms can preclude paying with undervalued stock and are more likely to experience positive long-term excess returns.

We find that CEOs release 20% more discretionary news items in months in which they are expected to sell equity, predicted using scheduled vesting months. These vesting months are determined by equity grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely driven by the current information environment. The increase arises for positive news, but not neutral or negative news, nor non-discretionary news. News releases fall in the month before and month after the vesting month. News in vesting months generates a temporary increase in stock prices and market liquidity, which the CEO exploits by cashing out shortly afterwards.

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