This article studies how institutional dynamics might affect the implementation of climaterelated financial policies. First, we propose a three-dimensional framework to distinguish: i) motives for policy implementation (prudential or promotional); ii) policy instruments (informational, incentive or coercive); and iii) implementing authorities (political or delegated). Second, we use this framework to show how sustainable financial interventions in certain jurisdictions -most notably, Europe -rely solely on informational policies to achieve both promotional and prudential objectives. Policymakers in other jurisdictions -e.g., Chinaalso implement incentive or coercive financial policies to achieve promotional objectives. Third, we identify two main institutional explanations for this European 'promotional gap': i) limited control of political authorities on financial dynamics; and ii) strong powers and independence of delegated authorities. This governance configuration leads to an institutional deadlock in which only measures fitting with both political and delegated authorities' objectives can be implemented. Finally, we discuss the scenarios that might originate from the current institutional setting. We identify three possible evolutionary paths: i) a drift towards a green financial technocracy; ii) a re-politicization of delegated authorities; iii) a move towards fiscal-monetary coordination.

This article studies how institutional dynamics might affect the implementation of climaterelated financial policies. First, we propose a three-dimensional framework to distinguish: i) motives for policy implementation (prudential or promotional); ii) policy instruments (informational, incentive or coercive); and iii) implementing authorities (political or delegated). Second, we use this framework to show how sustainable financial interventions in certain jurisdictions -most notably, Europe -rely solely on informational policies to achieve both promotional and prudential objectives. Policymakers in other jurisdictions -e.g., Chinaalso implement incentive or coercive financial policies to achieve promotional objectives. Third, we identify two main institutional explanations for this European 'promotional gap': i) limited control of political authorities on financial dynamics; and ii) strong powers and independence of delegated authorities. This governance configuration leads to an institutional deadlock in which only measures fitting with both political and delegated authorities' objectives can be implemented. Finally, we discuss the scenarios that might originate from the current institutional setting. We identify three possible evolutionary paths: i) a drift towards a green financial technocracy; ii) a re-politicization of delegated authorities; iii) a move towards fiscal-monetary coordination.

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