When people are allowed freedom to volunteer or withhold information, they can enhance the accuracy of their memory reports substantially relative to forced-report performance. A theoretical framework addressing the strategic regulation of memory reporting is put forward that delineates the mediating role of metamemorial monitoring and control processes. Although the enhancement of memory accuracy is generally accompanied by a reduction in memory quantity, experimental and simulation results indicate that both of these effects depend critically on (a) accuracy incentive and (b) monitoring effectiveness. The results are discussed with regard to the contribution of meta-memory processes to memory performance, and a general methodology is proposed that incorporates these processes into the assessment of memory-accuracy and memory-quantity performance.

There has been unprecedented interest in recent years in questions pertaining to accuracy and distortion in memory. This interest, catalyzed in part by real-life problems, marks a significant departure from the quantity-oriented approach that has characterized much of traditional memory research. We outline a correspondence metaphor of memory underlying accuracy-oriented research, and show how the features of this metaphor are manifested across the disparate bodies of research reviewed here. These include work in the Gestalt tradition, spatial memory, memory for gist, schema theory, source monitoring, fluency misattributions, false recall and recognition, postevent misinformation, false memories, eyewitness research, and autobiographical memory. In examining the dynamics of memory accuracy, we highlight the importance of metacognitive monitoring and control processes. We end by discussing some of the methodological, theoretical, and metatheoretical issues inherent in accuracy-oriented research, attempting to prepare the groundwork for a more coherent psychology of memory accuracy.

A distinction is drawn between the quantity-oriented approach to memory that has dominated traditional laboratory research, and the accuracy-oriented approach that is emerging in the study of everyday memory. This distinction is shown to underlie some troubling confusions in the interpretation of empirical findings. In particular, the recall-recognition paradox, which involves the claimed superiority of recall over recognition memory in naturalistic settings, is shown to stem from the common confounding between memory property (quantity vs. accuracy) and 2 other variables that have not generally been distinguished--test format (production vs. selection) and report option (free vs. forced reporting). Three laboratory experiments reveal the fundamentally different roles played by report option and test format in accuracy-based and quantity-based memory research. Implications for memory assessment, metamemory, and the everyday-laboratory controversy are discussed.

To increase their report accuracy, rememberers may either withhold information that they feel unsure about or provide relatively coarse information that is unlikely to be wrong. In previous work (A. Koriat & M. Goldsmith, 1996c), the authors delineated the metacognitive monitoring and control processes underlying the decision to volunteer or withhold particular items of information (report option) and examined how these processes are used in the strategic regulation of memory accuracy. This article adapts that framework to address control over the grain size (precision-coarseness) of the information that people report. Results show that rememberers strategically regulate the grain of their answers to accommodate the competing goals of accuracy and informativeness. The metacognitive processes underlying this regulation are elucidated. Q: Please tell me what you saw as you were getting out of your car. A: I had just opened the door when I heard someone scream on the other side of the street. As I looked up, a man in a sweat suit burst through the gate of the yard and ran like crazy down the alley. He seemed to be carrying a bag or something over his shoulder. Q: What color was the bag? A: I'm not sure. I think it was a reddish color-red or maybe orange-with some sort of striped pattern.

Despite immense technological advances, learners still prefer studying text from printed hardcopy rather than from computer screens. Subjective and objective differences between on-screen and on-paper learning were examined in terms of a set of cognitive and metacognitive components, comprising a Metacognitive Learning Regulation Profile (MLRP) for each study media. Participants studied expository texts of 1000-1200 words in one of the two media and for each text they provided metacognitive prediction-of-performance judgments with respect to a subsequent multiple-choice test. Under fixed study time (Experiment 1), test performance did not differ between the two media, but when study time was self-regulated (Experiment 2) worse performance was observed on screen than on paper. The results suggest that the primary differences between the two study media are not cognitive but rather metacognitive--less accurate prediction of performance and more erratic study-time regulation on screen than on paper. More generally, this study highlights the contribution of metacognitive regulatory processes to learning and demonstrates the potential of the MLRP methodology for revealing the source of subjective and objective differences in study performance among study conditions.