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The Gade institute in Bergen was established in 1912, at the same time as the city's new hospital was opened at Haukeland. The aim of the benefactor F. G. Gade was that the institution should function as a research institute in addition to being the hospital's pathological department and laboratory. The task of leading this work was given to a young cancer researcher, Magnus Haaland. He succeeded in establishing an effective research school within these institutional settings through educating assistants in pathological-anatomic, bacteriological and serological themes during a two-year rotational arrangement. The institute produced a great number of scientific articles and also several doctoral dissertations. A hallmark for this research was its practical orientation; almost all the major works were concerned with important epidemic diseases in western Norway. A reform of the rotational arrangement and a bitter conflict between Haaland and the director of the hospital led to a less fruitful development for the institute from 1925 until Haaland's death in 1935.

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The final section explores the successes and failures of twentieth-century Norwegian shipping, in attempt to determine why maritime businesses failed; to pinpoint turbulence in the industry; and to examine success alongside failure to better understand how new opportunities arose out of each. It is split into four sections; the first explores the differing approaches to shipping during the World War One boom in Haugesund, southwest Norway, through the case studies of two brothers who owned shipping companies - one that thrived and one that failed - and determines that their choices were limited and the fates of each firm difficult to overturn. The second is a case study of four shipping businesses that failed during the 1970s and the reasons for their failure, which, despite the market depression, was mostly due to internal decision-making and poor governance. The third is a quantitative analysis of company sizes between the 1960s and 1970s which, through a careful consideration of statistics, determines that larger companies were far more likely than small to survive the economic crisis. The final segment explores the growth of the deep-sea car-carrying business between 1960 and 2008, and finds that specialised tonnage and the successful transformation of shipping services in the twentieth century could keep maritime businesses afloat.

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