PurposeExecutive decisions regarding capital financing are an important management aspect, especially during financing constraints and growth opportunities. The current study examines the impact of managerial skills of a company on capital financing decisions. Furthermore, it analyzed this nexus in financing constraints and growth opportunity situations.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use the GMM (generalized method of moments) estimation approach on a dataset of 20,651 firm-year observations of Chinese A-share companies from 2010 to 2019.FindingsThe authors’ findings are compatible with management signaling and reputation enhancement theories, since they show that managerial skill is connected with more substantial debt financing. Managers with high management skills are likely to have more debt financing as they can foresee the economic future of their companies and tactfully convey private information, lowering information inequality and enhancing their reputation. Furthermore, the authors also show that firms with restricted financial resources and growth opportunities make this relationship stronger. Capital structure and managerial skill findings are unaffected by alternative specifications, omitted factors, industry group bias and endogeneity.Originality/valueThis study sheds fresh light on the essential manager personality trait of managing ability and how it influences complicated corporate decision-making, particularly in the tough environment due to financing constraints and competitive growth. The authors argue that high-ability managers are compelled to use debt financing not only to lessen information asymmetry but also to guarantee that the market finds their superior ability. This work contributes significantly to the managerial ability literature and the capital structure literature supporting signaling theory.

The present study inspects the comparative effects of inside shareholding on firm value for group-affiliated firms and non-group-affiliated firms in Pakistan. The research uses the excess-value as a performance measure by employing a chop-shop approach in treatment effects regression model (TERM). The results reveal that lower level and higher level inside shareholding negatively associated with firms’ value. However, it positively relates at a moderate level. Also, inside shareholding-value relationship differs significantly for group-affiliated firms and non-group-affiliated firms. Firms with inside shareholding at lower level appear to more visible in business groups, and these firms show adverse firms’ value consistent with divergence of interest effect. Nevertheless, inside ownership firms at a higher level, namely standalone firms, negatively affect firm value with entrenchment effect. The findings also confirm non-linearity in inside shareholding-firm value relationships.