Studies testing cognitive theory of depression (Beck, 1963, 1987) and defining depression as a clinical syndrome are reviewed. Many aspects of the theory's descriptive claims about depressive thinking have been substantiated empirically, including (a) increased negativity of cognitions about the self, (b) increased hopelessness, (c) specificity of themes of loss to depressive syndromes rather than psychopathology in general, and (d) mood-congruent recall. Evidence that depressive thinking is especially inaccurate or illogical, however, is weak. Fewer studies have tested the theory's causal (diathesis-stress) hypotheses, and there is no strong evidence supporting them.

We tested whether dimensional measures of empathic ability, theory of mind, and intelligence would differentiate autism spectrum disorders from each other and from non-spectrum disorders. Tests were administered to children with a diagnosis of Autistic Disorder (AutD; n = 20), Asperger's Disorder (AspD; n = 28), Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (Inattentive Type) (ADHD; n = 35), Mental Retardation (Mild) (MR; n = 34), Anxiety Disorder (AnxD; n = 14), or No Psychological Disorder (NPD; n = 36). Results showed that empathic ability discriminated among groups on the autism spectrum (AutD < AspD < NPD). Because empathic ability is not independent of intelligence (AutD < AspD < NPD on intelligence; MR < ADHD < NPD on empathic ability), both dimensions are necessary to discriminate autism spectrum from non-spectrum disorders. When intelligence is covaried, empathic ability discriminated AutD, but not AspD, from other disorders (AutD < MR < ADHD < NPD = AnxD = AspD).

We conclude that VI children have a specific emotion recognition deficit, but among HI children, performance on emotion recognition and emotion understanding tasks reflects delayed acquisition of a broad range of language-mediated abilities.

Children who have been diagnosed with any one developmental disorder are very likely to meet diagnostic criteria for some other developmental disorder. Although comorbidity has long been acknowledged in childhood disorders, little is understood about the mechanisms that are responsible for the high level of comorbidity. In a series of studies, we have investigated the link between sensory-motor deficits and developmental disorders. Poor sensory-motor integration has long been implicated as a cause of motor problems in developmental disorders such as developmental coordination disorder (DCD), and our recent research has also investigated sensory-motor deficits in children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and autistic disorder. Based on a critical examination of relevant literature and some of our recent research findings, we argue that the importance of poor sensory-motor functioning in discriminating children with different disorders has been underestimated. Poor sensory-motor coordination appears to be linked to DCD, but not ADHD. Also, sensory-motor deficits in children with DCD and autistic disorder may provide insight into some of the social difficulties found in these groups of children. This research will increase our understanding of why children with one developmental disorder typically also have problems in other areas.

This study provides initial evidence that the specific process of legacy creation is able to positively affect sense of generativity, meaning, and acceptance near end of life. High acceptability and satisfaction rates for both DT and LR and positive impacts on families/carers of DT participants provide additional support for clinical utility of these interventions. Further evaluation of specific mechanisms of change post-intervention is required given DT's uncertain efficacy on other primary outcomes.