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Despite some promising steps in the right direction, organizational analysis has yet to exploit fully the theoretical and empirical possibilities inherent in the writings of Pierre Bourdieu. While certain concepts associated with his thought, such as field and capital, are already widely known in the organizational literature, the specific ways in which these terms are being used provide ample evidence that the full significance of his relational mode of thought has yet to be sufficiently apprehended. Moreover, the almost complete inattention to habitus, the third of Bourdieu's major concepts, without which the concepts of field and capital (at least as he deployed them) make no sense, further attests to the misappropriation of his ideas and to the lack of appreciation of their potential usefulness. It is our aim in this paper, by contrast, to set forth a more informed and comprehensive account of what a relational -and, in particular, a Bourdieu-inspired -agenda for organizational research might look like. Accordingly, we examine the implications of his theoretical framework for interorganizational relations, as well as for organizations themselves analyzed as fields. The primary advantage of such an approach, we argue, is the central place accorded therein to the social conditions under which inter-and intraorganizational power relations are produced, reproduced, and contested.Despite some promising steps in the right direction, organizational analysis has yet to exploit fully the theoretical and empirical possibilities inherent in a relational

We aim to show how collective emotions can be incorporated into the study of episodes of political contention. In a critical vein, we systematically explore the weaknesses in extant models of collective action, showing what has been lost through a neglect or faulty conceptualization of collective emotional configurations. We structure this discussion in terms of a review of several "pernicious postulates" in the literature, assumptions that have been held, we argue, by classical social-movement theorists and by social-structural and cultural critics alike. In a reconstructive vein, however, we also lay out the foundations of a more satisfactory theoretical framework. We take each succeeding critique of a pernicious postulate as the occasion for more positive theorybuilding. Drawing upon the work of the classical American pragmatists-especially Peirce, Dewey, and Mead-as well as aspects of Bourdieu's sociology, we construct, step by step, the foundations of a more adequate theorization of social movements and collective action. Accordingly, the negative and positive threads of our discussion are woven closely together: the dismantling of pernicious postulates and the development of a more useful analytical strategy.We are concerned here with the role of collective emotions in episodes of political contention. We set forth new ways of conceptualizing and analyzing these emotional configurations and propose an agenda for future empirical research. The literatures that we address concern social movements and collective action. For reasons of space, we do not systematically discuss other closely related work-for example, the study of revolutions, ethnic mobilizations, democratization, or nationalismbut consider our ideas to have significant implications for these literatures as well and occasionally refer to substantive writings from them in developing our theoretical arguments. It is because social movements never occur simply within a vacuum but always engage with a wide range of other institutional and extra-institutional forces that we use the phrase "episodes of political contention" to denote the focus of our analysis. As we conceive it, political contention is "episodic rather than continuous, occurs in public, involves interaction between makers of