Luminaries like Martin Luther King, Jr. urge that Black Americans love even those who hate them. This can look like a rejection of anger at racial injustice. We see this rejection, too, in the growing trend of characterizing social justice movements as radical hate groups, and people who get angry at injustice as bitter and unloving. Philosophers like Martha Nussbaum argue that anger is backwardlooking, status focused, and retributive. Citing the life of the Prodigal Son, the victims of the Charleston Church shooting, Gandhi, and King, she claims that we should choose love instead of anger-not only in our intimate relationships but also in the political realm. Buddhist monk and scholar, Shāntideva, argued that anger is an obstacle to love. Anger leads to suffering. Love frees us from suffering. All this makes an initially compelling case against anger at racial injustice. In addition, although philosophers Jeffrie Murphy and Antti Kauppinen argue that anger communicates self-respect and valuing, respectively, they make no connection between agape love and anger. In this essay I'll show that the love King and others have in mind-agape love-is not only compatible with anger at hateful racists and complicit others, but finds valuable expression in such anger. Agape Love I will begin first by providing an account of agape love and showing why it is an apt response in a political context.

This research note is meant to introduce into philosophical discussion the preliminary results of an empirical study on the state of blacks in philosophy, which is a joint effort of the American Philosophical Association's Committee on the Status of Black Philosophers (APA CSBP) and the Society of Young Black Philosophers (SYBP). The study is intended to settle factual issues in furtherance of contributing to dialogues surrounding at least two philosophical questions: What, if anything, is the philosophical value of demographic diversity in professional philosophy? And what is philosophy? The empirical goals of the study are (1) to identify and enumerate U.S. blacks in philosophy, (2) to determine the distribution of blacks in philosophy across career stages, (3) to determine correlates to the success of blacks in philosophy at different career stages, and (4) to compare and contrast results internally and externally to explain any career stage gaps and determine any other disparities.

The Case for Rage is a philosophical defense of anger, particularly anger at racial injustice. Crossing the terrain of moral psychology, ethics, philosophy of race, and social and political philosophy, the book shows anger’s varieties and cautions readers not to paint it in broad strokes. The book shows how a certain kind of anger at racial injustice is a fitting, appropriate, and correct response to racism; can motivate those who are outraged at racism by affecting their beliefs and desires; and can be productive in the fight against racism. It also explains how a person can resist white supremacy with their rage by breaking racial rules. The book also provides suggestions for how the angry might manage their anger—not through eradication or moderation, but through cultivation and community.

In this brief essay, I sketch out the philosophical landscape considering anger in general, and political anger in particular. I begin by sketching anger's profile and its relation to judgments. I also consider the role anger plays in moral life. I then consider how philosophers have conceived of political anger, particularly anger that arises in a context of oppression. I survey claims in support of anger's value, as well as debates around its counterproductivity. And I suggest that debates can benefit from taking seriously different species of anger, and the injustices and burdens that are implicit in our forswearing, eradication, or moderation recommendations. I conclude with reflections on recent research and suggestions for future research.

In Entangled Empathy, Lori Gruen offers an alternative ethic for our relationships with animals. In this article, I examine Gruen's account of entangled empathy by first focusing on entangled empathy's relation to the moral emotions of sympathy, compassion, and other emotions. I then challenge Gruen's account of how entangled empathy moves us to attend to others. Lastly, and without intending to place humans at the center of the conversation, I reflect on the ways entangled empathy can help us solve some human problems—particularly the racial divide in the United States.