This article investigates how the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (US) govern labour provisions in Mexico and Morocco. Drawing on the external governance approach and distinguishing between governance through hierarchy and governance through network, it aims to assess the extent to which the EU and US enforce labour provisions by hierarchical means and promote them through horizontal, network-based interaction. In doing so, this study not only sheds light on the de jure component (i.e., modes of labour governance in preferential trade agreements), but also analyses the de facto dimension (i.e., modes of labour governance at the domestic level). The article reveals that the EU and US de jure rely on hierarchical and networked means while de facto they generally emphasize the latter. Hence, contrary to what a power-based hypothesis would suggest, structures of power do not determine EU and US external governance of labour provisions.

This study critically reflects on the involvement of civil society actors in the sustainable development chapters of recent EU trade agreements. It discusses how civil society mechanisms may legitimise the underlying neoliberal orientation of the agreements through co-optation of critical actors. Starting from a critical perspective and drawing on evidence from innovative survey data, qualitative interviews and participatory observations, it concludes that, despite overall criticism, there is no clear evidence of co-optation. While being aware of the risks their participation entail, EU participants take a constructive position. Nevertheless, diverging perspectives between non-profit and business actors risk reinforcing existing power asymmetries.

US free trade agreements comprise unique provisions that enable civil society to present public complaints against labor rights violations occurring in the US or its trade partners. To date, a variety of complainants have used these mechanisms, including (inter)national trade unions, human rights organizations, and a priest. And yet, little is known about the submissions' nature of agency and the effects it has on the procedural continuations to address illicit labor practices. To fill this research lacuna, this article employs a multidisciplinary framework of 'actorness' that measures the submitters' diversity (professionalism/non-professionalism, collectivism/individualism, transnationalism/nationalism) and their effectiveness (rejection/acceptance of submissions and further procedural follow-ups). Combining quantitative examination with in-depth analysis of two diverse cases of actorness, and drawing on expert interviews, public reports, and minutes of meetings, the study reveals that the majority of public submissions were of professional, collective, and transnational nature. However, contrary to what extant literature suggests, this is not a guarantee that they achieve more far-reaching procedural steps in the protection of workers. Non-professional, individual, and national actorness can compensate for the advantages of professionalism, collectivism, and transnationalism.

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