We document how the effectiveness of an accruals-based trading strategy changes with the benchmark used to identify an extreme accrual. We measure “percent accruals” as accruals scaled by earnings, rather than total assets, and show that this seemingly small change produces a radically different sort of the data. We find that a trading strategy based on percent accruals yields significantly larger annual hedge returns than the traditional accruals measure, and does so mostly by improving the long position in low-accrual stocks. The hedge returns are also significant in all but the lowest quintile of arbitrage risk. We show that percent accruals more effectively select firms where the difference between sophisticated and nai¨ve forecasts are the most extreme. As such, our results are consistent with the earnings fixation hypothesis and are inconsistent with some alternative explanations for the accrual anomaly.

Managers in management leveraged buyout (MBO) firms prefer to purchase their firms at a low offer price. This motive gives them a clear incentive to make pessimistic discretionary disclosures. Using a sample of press releases, I find that managers involved in their firms' MBO selectively release negative disclosures to denigrate their firm just before the MBO transaction when compared with prior period: they issue more bad news disclosures and more pessimistic quotes. Additionally, they issue less optimistic quotes, fewer good news disclosures, less positive earnings forecasts, and they manage earnings downwards. I control for factors that may not be caused by managers' purchase motives by comparing the MBO sample with a third-party leveraged buyout sample where management is not involved in the buyout and with a performance-matched control sample. I find that the disclosure of MBO firms becomes significantly more pessimistic than the leveraged buyout firms where management is not involved in the transaction and significantly more pessimistic than the performance-matched control sample.Keywords Leveraged buyout Á Management buyout Á Disclosure JEL Classifications G24 Á M41This paper is based on Nader Hafzalla's dissertation research at the University of Michigan. Nader died unexpectedly on June 29, 2006. He was a great student, a loyal friend and a ton of fun. His dissertation committee members are Russell Lundholm (chair), Patricia Dechow, Richard Sloan, and Sugato Bhattacharyya. Nader also received help on this work from all the faculty and doctoral students at Michigan, particularly

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