In his recent article 'Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology', 1 Gilbert Harman, with support from the field of social psychology, introduces to moral philosophy the idea that there is no evidence for the existence of character traits. 2 Attributions of character traits are, in truth, questionable common intuitions that ought to be rejected, and which result from a failure to appreciate the importance of situational factors. Harman discusses two experimental studies which show that behaviour is best explained by reference to situational factors rather than the supposition of character traits. Supposing that the behaviour of agents is due to their distinctive character traits, rather than situational factors, is committing the fundamental attribution error and the main moral theory guilty of committing this error is virtue ethics. If Harman's criticism is correct, then virtue ethics is not justified in placing such great importance on character traits 3 as '[i]t seems that ordinary attributions of character traits to people are often deeply misguided and it may even be the case that there is no such thing as character, no ordinary character traits of the sort people think there are, none of the usual moral virtues and vices'. 4

This article examines when deceptive withholding of information is ethically acceptable in research. The first half analyses the concept of deception. We argue that there are two types of accounts of deception: normative and non-normative, and argue that non-normative accounts are preferable. The second half of the article argues that the relevant ethical question which ethics committees should focus on is not whether the person from whom the information is withheld will be deceived, but rather on the reasonableness of withholding the information from the person who is deceived. We further argue that the reasonableness of withholding information is dependent on the context. The last section examines how the context of research should shape our judgements about the circumstances in which withholding information from research participants is ethically acceptable. We argue that some important features of research make it more difficult to justify withholding information in the context of research than elsewhere.

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Most discussions of risk are developed in broadly consequentialist terms, focusing on the outcomes of risks as such. This paper will provide an alternative account of risk from a virtue ethical perspective, shifting the focus on the decision to take the risk. Making ethical decisions about risk is, we will argue, not fundamentally about the actual chain of events that the decision sets in process, but about the reasonableness of the decision to take the risk in the first place. A virtue ethical account of risk is needed because the notion of the 'reasonableness' of the decision to take the risk is affected by the complexity of the moral status of particular instances of risk-taking and the risk-taker's responsiveness to these contextual features. The very idea of 'reasonable risk' welcomes judgements about the nature of the risk itself, raises questions about complicity, culpability and responsibility, while at its heart, involves a judgement about the justification of risk which unavoidably focuses our attention on the character of the individuals involved in risk-making decisions.

Making decisions with an, often significant, element of risk seems to be an integral part of many of the projects of the diverse profession of engineering. Whether it be decisions about the design of products, manufacturing processes, public works, or developing technological solutions to environmental, social and global problems, risk taking seems inherent to the profession. Despite this, little attention has been paid to the topic and specifically to how our understanding of engineering as a distinctive profession might affect how we should make decisions under risk. This paper seeks to remedy this, firstly by offering a nuanced account of risk and then by considering how specific claims about our understanding of engineering as a social profession, with corresponding social values and obligations, should inform how we make decisions about risk in this context.