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Previous research suggests a possible link between eveningness and general difficulties with self-regulation (e.g., evening types are more likely than other chronotypes to have irregular sleep schedules and social rhythms and use substances). Our study investigated the relationship between eveningness and self-regulation by using two standardized measures of self-regulation: the Self-Control Scale and the Procrastination Scale. We predicted that an eveningness preference would be associated with poorer self-control and greater procrastination than would an intermediate or morningness preference. Participants were 308 psychology students (mean age=19.92 yrs) at a small Canadian college. Students completed the self-regulation questionnaires and Morningness/Eveningness Questionnaire (MEQ) online. The mean MEQ score was 46.69 (SD=8.20), which is intermediate between morningness and eveningness. MEQ scores ranged from definite morningness to definite eveningness, but the dispersion of scores was skewed toward more eveningness. Pearson and partial correlations (controlling for age) were used to assess the relationship between MEQ score and the Self-Control Scale (global score and 5 subscale scores) and Procrastination Scale (global score). All correlations were significant. The magnitude of the effects was medium for all measures except one of the Self-Control subscales, which was small. A multiple regression analysis to predict MEQ score using the Self-Control Scale (global score), Procrastination Scale, and age as predictors indicated the Self-Control Scale was a significant predictor (accounting for 20% of the variance). A multiple regression analysis to predict MEQ scores using the five subscales of the Self-Control Scale and age as predictors showed the subscales for reliability and work ethic were significant predictors (accounting for 33% of the variance). Our study showed a relationship between eveningness and low self-control, but it did not address whether the relationship is a causal one.

To shed light on the referential processes that underlie mental translation between representations of objects and words, we studied the reciprocity and determinants of naming and imaging reaction times (RT). Ninety-six subjects pressed a key when they had covertly named 248 pictures or imaged to their names. Mean naming and imagery RTs for each item were correlated with one another, and with properties of names, images, and their interconnections suggested by prior research and dual coding theory. Imagery RTs correlated .56 (df = 246) with manual naming RTs and .58 with voicekey naming RTs from prior studies. A factor analysis of the RTs and of 31 item characteristics revealed 7 dimensions. Imagery and naming RTs loaded on a common referential factor that included variables related to both directions of processing (e.g., missing names and missing images). Naming RTs also loaded on a nonverbal-to-verbal factor that included such variables as number of different names, whereas imagery RTs loaded on a verbalto-nonverbal factor that included such variables as rated consistency of imagery. The other factors were verbal familiarity, verbal complexity, nonverbal familiarity, and nonverbal complexity. The findings confirm the reciprocity of imaging and naming, and their relation to constructs associated with distinct phases of referential processing.Mental translation between verbal and nonverbal information is an important associative activity. Such code switching has been termed referential processing (Paivio, 1971(Paivio, , 1986 or referential activity (Bucci, 1984;Bucci & Freeman, 1978), and it is reflected most directly in picture-naming and word-imaging tasks. Referential processing is implicated as well in memory of pictures and words, symbolic comparisons, language comprehension, cognitive deficits after brain damage (e.g., Kosslyn, 1987;Thompson, Hall, & Sison, 1986), and other cognitive phenomena, and it raises important conceptual issues on which contemporary theories of mental representation differ. Dual coding theory (Paivio, 1971(Paivio, , 1986 maintains that verbal and nonverbal representations are directly connected in a one-to-many fashion in both directions, whereas common coding models assume that crossmodal processing requires activation of shared abstract representations (e.g., Potter & Faulconer, 1975;Snodgrass, 1984). Research on naming and imaging also addresses specific theoretical issues, as, for example, the question of whether images are constructed sequentially from components (e.g., Kosslyn, 1980) or are activated holistically (e.g., Paivio, 1971, p. 58; 1986, p. 60).Despite the familiarity and theoretical importance of referential processing, we lack systematic information This research was supported by grant AOO87 to Allan Paivio from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada. We thank Carla Johnson for helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper, and Kal Csapo, who collected some of the older data that we used. Address correspondence to Allan Paivio, Department...

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In 1920, John B. Watson and Rosalie Rayner attempted to condition a phobia in a young infant named "Albert B." In 2009, Beck, Levinson, and Irons proposed that Little Albert, as he is now known, was actually an infant named Douglas Merritte. More recently, Fridlund, Beck, Goldie, and Irons (2012) claimed that Little Albert (Douglas) was neurologically impaired at the time of the experiment. They also alleged that Watson, in a severe breach of ethics, probably knew of Little Albert's condition when selecting him for the study and then fraudulently hid this fact in his published accounts of the case. In this article, we present the discovery of another individual, Albert Barger, who appears to match the characteristics of Little Albert better than Douglas Merritte does. We examine the evidence for Albert Barger as having been Little Albert and, where relevant, contrast it with the evidence for Douglas Merritte. As for the allegations of fraudulent activity by Watson, we offer comments at the end of this article. We also present evidence concerning whether Little Albert (Albert Barger) grew up with the fear of furry animals, as Watson and Rayner speculated he might.