Introduction While political scientists and legal academics have both evinced a “fascination with disagreement on courts,”1 this scholarly concentration on conflict rather than consensus has tended to focus on dissent and dissenting opinions. As far as we can tell, there is no authoritative history of concurring opinions in the U.S. Supreme Court. This article is a first effort to correct that oversight by examining developments and change in concurring behavior from the founding through the White Court (1921). This period covers the emergence of an institutionally independent national judicial branch and ends before the start of the modern, policy‐making Court era, which we argue begins with the Taft Court and the creation of a fully discretionary docket.

Justices' goals when writing concurrences continue to elude scholars. This project extends Baum's contention that justices' goals are bifurcated. The authors argue that justices use concurrences as means to both speak about their legal policy preferences and win by being members of the majority voting coalition. An analysis of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' concurring behavior illustrates that members of the Court are both authoring and joining concurrences in ways previously undocumented. Specifically, justices have become comfortable not only authoring concurrences but regularly joining others' separate opinions as well-a trend the authors call choral-Court decision making.

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Many constitutional courts, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, have more power than the “constrained court” model of judicial decisionmaking suggests because they operate in an increasingly international environment. By analyzing the Estonian Supreme Court's adjudication of minority linguistic rights, we show how even a new court can act as a “conduit” for democratic reform by identifying for legislators national constitutional paths along which domestically disliked but internationally defined democratic reforms can be pursued, preserving national integrity while acknowledging international reality. International pressures, while constraining courts, thus can free them from national constraints while allowing them to imprint their own vision.