The central point of this examination is to research the effect of corporate governance on earning management practices in India. Its results, if proved significant, can thereon be applied to curb earnings management. We utilized random-effect point estimates on 1613 non-Finance organizations working in the Indian subcontinent. The data pans from 2004 till 2018. Corporate governance has been evaluated on the basis of four of its divergent practices (board size, CEO-chair duality, managerial ownership, and audit committee independence) while discretionary accruals have been utilized as an intermediary for estimating malpractices in the income. This has been accomplished by employing the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) to obtain the results. The empirical findings are in accordance with the concept of corporate governance. CEOchair duality is significantly connected with practices of earnings management and is thus, noteworthy. However, one of the corporate administration factors, board size, is found irrelevantly identified with earnings manipulation. The examination enhances the current writings on the subject matter; that there is a negative relationship with the two major areas of the study, namely, corporate governance and earnings manipulation. The investigation accords explicitly by confirming that in emerging nations, corporate administration must have a negative impact on the issue of earnings manipulation. The importance of the research is enhanced by the prevalence of the, so called, "interest war" among the minority and controlling shareholder(s) than between the executives and proprietors, in developing countries like India. Contribution/ Originality:This study contributes in the existing literature by expanding the research to a large sample over a period of 14 years. Further, the research is based on recent data and is focused on Indian economy, which is uniquely characterized largely by family controlled businesses and interest war.