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It is difficult to describe the flow characteristics within and above urban canopies using only geometrical parameters such as plan area index (λ p ) and frontal area index (λ f ) because urban surfaces comprise buildings with random layouts, shapes, and heights. Furthermore, two types of 'randomness' are associated with the geometry of building arrays: the randomness of element heights (vertical) and that of the rotation angles of each block (horizontal). In this study, wind-tunnel experiments were conducted on seven types of urban building arrays with various roughness packing densities to measure the bulk drag coefficient (C d ) and mean wind profile; aerodynamic parameters such as roughness length (z o ) and displacement height (d) were also estimated. The results are compared with previous results from regular arrays having neither 'vertical' nor 'horizontal' randomness. In vertical random arrays, the plot of C d and z o versus λ f exhibited a monotonic increase, and z o increased by a factor of almost two for λ f = 48-70%. C d was strongly influenced by the standard deviation of the height of blocks (σ ) when λ p ≥ 17%, whereas C d was independent of σ when λ p = 7%. In the case of horizontal random arrays, the plot of the estimated C d against λ f showed a peak. The effect of both vertical and horizontal randomness of the layout on aerodynamic parameters can be explained by the structure of the vortices around the blocks; the aspect ratio of the block is an appropriate index for the estimation of such features.

We propose a new pairwise Fermi updating rule by considering a social average payoff when an agent copies a neighbor's strategy. In the update rule, a focal agent compares her payoff with the social average payoff of the same strategy that her pairwise opponent has. This concept might be justified by the fact that people reference global and, somehow, statistical information, not local information when imitating social behaviors. We presume several possible ways for the social average. Simulation results prove that the social average of some limited agents realizes more significant cooperation than that of the entire population.

Motivated by the fact that there are quite a few ill-mannered drivers who disregard traffic rules concerning lane-changing and maximum speed, we investigated an interesting question: whether or not social dilemma structures can be formed from a frequent dangerous lane-changing attitude in a typical traffic flow without any explicit bottlenecks. In our model system, two classes of driver-agents coexist: C agents (cooperative strategy) always keep to traffic regulations with respect to lane-changing and speed, while D agents (defective strategy) disregard them to move ahead. In relatively high-density flows, such as the metastable and high-density phases, we found structures that correspond to either n-person Prisoner's Dilemma (n-PD) games or to quasi-PD games. In these situations, existing ill-mannered drivers create heavy traffic jams that reduce social efficiency.