This article estimates the degree of tax noncompliance using evidence from unaudited tax returns. Measurements of noncompliance are derived from the relationship between reported charitable contributions and reported income from wages and salary as compared to alternative reported income sources such as self-employment, farm and other small business income. Assuming that the source of one's income is unrelated to one's charitable inclinations and that the ratio of true income to taxable income does not vary by income source, any difference in the relationship between charitable contributions and the source of income can be attributed to (relative) underreporting by the individual. We find that the implied amount of noncompliance is significant and that it varies by source of income, as well as between positive and negative values of each type of income. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. We provide empirical evidence of crime's impact on the mental wellbeing of both victims and non-victims. We differentiate between the direct impact to victims and the indirect impact to society due to the fear of crime. The results show a decrease in mental wellbeing after violent crime victimization and that the violent crime rate has a negative impact on mental wellbeing of non-victims. Property crime victimization and property crime rates show no such comparable impact. Finally, we estimate that society-wide compensation due to increasing the crime rate by one victim is about 80 times more than the direct impact on the victim.JEL Classification: I31, R28

Computerized physician order entry (CPOE) has been shown to reduce preventable, potential adverse events. Despite this evidence, fewer than 5 percent of U.S. hospitals have fully implemented these systems. We assess empirically alternative reasons for low CPOE implementation using data from various sources. We find that CPOE is related to hospital ownership and teaching status; government and teaching hospitals are much more likely than other hospital types are to invest in CPOE. Hospital profitability is not associated with CPOE investment. Although greater diffusion of CPOE is needed, it might have to await continuing publicity efforts and substantial reimbursement system changes. Re c e n t a dvan c e s i n i n f o r m at i o n t e c h n o l o gy provide hospitals with new opportunities to reduce their rates of medication errors. Computerized physician order entry (CPOE) systems-information systems that allow physicians to enter orders electronically-have been shown to reduce potential errors. Depending on the system, they can integrate orders with other patient information, allow physicians easy access to medical guidelines and cost information, process in-hospital orders to pharmacies, and create legible prescriptions. Studies show that CPOE has improved physicians' prescribing practices.1 In fact, estimates of CPOE's effect on error prevention range as high as 80 percent, although some studies have identified overlooked, technology-related errors that would lower estimated effects.2 Based on the potential to improve quality, national organizations such as the Institute of Medicine, Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, President's Information Technology Advisory Committee, and Leapfrog Group have identified CPOE as an important technology for preventing medical error. 3Despite potential benefits, only an estimated 4-10 percent of U.S. hospitals have fully implemented CPOE. 4 Here we examine which types of hospitals have acquired CPOE systems and why the rate is so low. We use data on CPOE ownership from the Leapfrog Group, a consortium of more than 130 Fortune 500 compa- D a t a W a t c h

This paper analyzes the impact of a preferential tax-price for monetary donations on the joint decision to donate time (volunteer) and money. The methodological approach takes into account that consumption of each charitable good affects consumption of the other. Using data from a national survey on household charitable giving, the results show that donations of time and money are substitutes. However, a decrease in the tax-price of monetary donations also has a positive effect on donations of time that acts outside the change in relative prices. This more than offsets the substitution effect leading to an overall positive correlation between the two charitable goods. (JEL D64, H24, H31)

We test the equivalence of tax-inclusive, tax-exclusive and tax-rebate prices through a series of experiments differing only in their handling of the tax. Subjects receive a cash budget and decide how much to keep and how much to spend on various attractively priced goods. Subjects spend significantly more under tax-exclusive prices whereas total purchases under tax-inclusive and tax-rebate prices are similar. These results persist throughout most of the ten rounds despite feedback and the ability to revise purchases. The asymmetric response to tax liabilities and rebates highlights consumers' ability both to internalize and to willfully ignore hidden price components. (JEL D12, H25, H31)A n emerging empirical literature on price partitioning highlights firms' ability to increase consumer demand by not displaying the final price (see, e.g., Hossain and Morgan 2006; Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2009). In particular, these studies demonstrate that when price components are shrouded or hidden such that the posted price is less than the all-inclusive price higher demand ensues. The lack of salience of the shrouded price components is the explanation typically put forth. Are consumers really so woefully unaware of the amount to be added at the checkout or might they consciously choose to ignore it? Moreover, how does consumer demand respond to price components that are deducted at the register such that the final price is below the initial price?In this paper, we introduce a series of carefully designed laboratory experimental treatments that, for the first time, address these questions. Specifically, we test the equivalence of tax-inclusive, tax-exclusive, and tax-deduction prices in a laboratory setting that admits controlled variation. A number of attractive goods highly discounted in price are presented to each subject who decides how much of his cash endowment to keep and how much to spend on purchases of each good. The subject repeats participants from numerous departmental seminars and conferences, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. Ziv Ben-Naim provided excellent research assistance. We are grateful to Ben-Gurion University for funding the experiments. The analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board or members of the research staff.