ObjectivesTo explore health-worker perspectives on security, improving safety, managing constrained resources and handling mass casualties during besiegement in Syria.DesignA qualitative study using semi-structured key informant interviews, conducted remotely over WhatsApp and Skype, and analysed thematically using inductive coding.SettingSecondary and tertiary health facilities affected by besiegement in Aleppo (from July to December 2016) and Rural Damascus (from August 2013 to February 2018).ParticipantsTwenty-one male Syrian health-workers and service-users who had experienced besiegement and targeting of their health facilities.ResultsParticipants described four related challenges of: (i) conflict-related responses, particularly responding to mass casualties; (ii) targeted attack responses, particularly preventing/surviving facility bombings; (iii) besiegement responses, particularly mitigating severe resource constraints; and (iv) chronic risk responses, particularly maintaining emotional resilience. Mass casualty response involved triage and training to prioritise mortality reduction and available resources, for example those with greatest need and likelihood of survival. Targeting response was largely physical, including fortification, working underground, reducing visibility and services dispersal. Besiegement response required resource conservation, for example, controlling consumption, reusing consumables, low-technology equipment, finding alternative supply routes, stockpiling and strengthening available human resources through online trainings and establishing a medical school in Ghouta. Risk responses included managing safety worries, finding value in work and maintaining hope.ConclusionBesieged health-workers were most affected by severe resource constraints and safety concerns while responding to overwhelming mass casualty events. Lessons for targeting/besiegement planning include training staff and preparing for: (i) mass casualties, through local/online health-worker training in triage, emergency response and resource conservation; allowing task-shifting; and providing access to low-technology equipment; (ii) attacks, through strengthened facility security, for example, protection and deterrence through fortification, working underground and reducing visibility; and (iii) besiegement, through ensuring access to internet, electricity and low-technology/reusable equipment; securely stockpiling fuel, medicines and supplies; and establishing alternative supply routes.

Background Pay-for-performance (P4P) programmes to incentivise health providers to improve quality of care have been widely implemented globally. Despite intuitive appeal, evidence on the effectiveness of P4P is mixed, potentially due to differences in how schemes are designed. We exploited municipality variation in the design features of Brazil’s National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ) to examine whether performance bonuses given to family health team workers were associated with changes in the quality of care and whether the size of bonus mattered. Methods and findings For this quasi-experimental study, we used a difference-in-differences approach combined with matching. We compared changes over time in the quality of care delivered by family health teams between (bonus) municipalities that chose to use some or all of the PMAQ money to provide performance-related bonuses to team workers with (nonbonus) municipalities that invested the funds using traditional input-based budgets. The primary outcome was the PMAQ score, a quality of care index on a scale of 0 to 100, based on several hundred indicators (ranging from 598 to 660) of health care delivery. We did one-to-one matching of bonus municipalities to nonbonus municipalities based on baseline demographic and economic characteristics. On the matched sample, we used ordinary least squares regression to estimate the association of any bonus and size of bonus with the prepost change over time (between November 2011 and October 2015) in the PMAQ score. We performed subgroup analyses with respect to the local area income of the family health team. The matched analytical sample comprised 2,346 municipalities (1,173 nonbonus municipalities; 1,173 bonus municipalities), containing 10,275 family health teams that participated in PMAQ from the outset. Bonus municipalities were associated with a 4.6 (95% CI: 2.7 to 6.4; p < 0.001) percentage point increase in the PMAQ score compared with nonbonus municipalities. The association with quality of care increased with the size of bonus: the largest bonus group saw an improvement of 8.2 percentage points (95% CI: 6.2 to 10.2; p < 0.001) compared with the control. The subgroup analysis showed that the observed improvement in performance was most pronounced in the poorest two-fifths of localities. The limitations of the study include the potential for bias from unmeasured time-varying confounding and the fact that the PMAQ score has not been validated as a measure of quality of care. Conclusions Performance bonuses to family health team workers compared with traditional input-based budgets were associated with an improvement in the quality of care.

No abstract