SUMMARY: Engagement quality review is an integral part of the audit process. It is designed to be a quality control mechanism for assessing the quality of an audit engagement. Since the 1990s, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has increased sanctions against partners serving as engagement quality reviewers. Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued an auditing standard on engagement quality review as required by Section 103 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This practice note reports on an analysis of SEC and PCAOB enforcement actions against engagement quality reviewers (EQRs). Our results show the following: We identified 28 cases since 1993 that involve some type of sanction against an EQR. Only eight cases involved the Big 4/5 public accounting firms. All of the 28 cases involved sanctions due to violations of GAAS and 75 percent contained GAAP violations. Twenty-three cases identified GAAS violations related to a lack of due professional care. Further analysis of those cases showed that the EQR demonstrated a lack of professional skepticism in 22 cases, over-relied on management representations in 20 cases, and ignored materiality concerns in five cases. About half of the 28 cases resulted in the EQR being denied the privilege of practicing before the SEC or PCAOB for three or more years. Our findings provide important implications for practitioners and regulators, and areas for future research for those interested in engagement quality review.

Previous studies indicate that auditors are able to identify fraud risk factors, but may not be able to translate this knowledge into an audit plan that effectively takes these factors into account to increase the likelihood of detecting fraud. Fraud specialists may be able to compensate for such limitations. This study investigates the relative merits of involving fraud specialists in assisting auditors by developing an audit plan that would effectively address fraud risk in a revenue cycle. Results show that fraud specialists did not differ from auditors in the number of procedures selected from a standard audit program; nor were these procedures cumulatively more effective than those selected by auditors. Fraud specialists generated a greater number of non-standard additional audit procedures, and those procedures were marginally more effective, but less efficient, than those of auditors, except for certain groups of procedures. Finally, although the fraud specialists proposed significantly more additional (non-standard) procedures than auditors, their proposed budget increase for this category of procedures was significantly smaller than the budget increase proposed by auditors. Adjustments to the overall time budget did not differ between fraud specialists and auditors. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.

The position of an internal audit function (IAF) as a 'servant of two masters' (i.e., management and the audit committee) may lead to a conflict of priorities. In this setting, the tone at the top set by the Chief Audit Executive (CAE) plays a critical role in balancing the potentially competing priorities of the 'two masters'. We test two hypotheses in a mixed experimental design with the communicated preferences of the CAE to subordinates (cost reduction vs. effectiveness of internal controls) as a between-subjects factor, and levels of ambiguity (low, medium, high) manipulated within-subjects. Findings suggest that the emphasis in the CAE's message can influence internal auditors' judgments, and such influence is more pronounced when task ambiguity is high, resulting in the elimination of a significantly greater number of internal controls and the design of less effective processes. We discuss implications of our results for modern IAFs and the role of the CAE.

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