Mutually beneficial interactions often require trust that others will reciprocate. Such interpersonal trust is foundational to evolutionarily unique aspects of human social behaviour, such as economic exchange. In adults, interpersonal trust is often assessed using the ‘trust game’, in which a lender invests resources in a trustee who may or may not repay the loan. This game captures two crucial elements of economic exchange: the potential for greater mutual benefits by trusting in others, and the moral hazard that others may betray that trust. While adults across cultures can trust others, little is known about the developmental origins of this crucial cooperative ability. We developed the first version of the trust game for use with young children that addresses these two components of trust. Across three experiments, we demonstrate that 4- and 6-year-olds recognize opportunities to invest in others, sharing more when reciprocation is possible than in a context measuring pure generosity. Yet, children become better with age at investing in trustworthy over untrustworthy partners, indicating that this cooperative skill emerges later in ontogeny. Together, our results indicate that young children can engage in complex economic exchanges involving judgements about interpersonal trust and show increasing sensitivity to appropriate partners over development.

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Objective: The development of habit (i.e., behavioral automaticity, the extent to which a behavior is performed with decreased thresholds for time, attention [effort], conscious awareness, and goal dependence), for goal-directed health behaviors facilitates health behavior engagement in daily life. However, there is a paucity of research examining automaticity for Type 1 diabetes self-management in adolescence. This study examined if greater perceived automaticity for diabetes self-management was associated with increased daily selfmanagement, decreased daily self-regulation failures in glucose checking, and more optimal daily glycemic levels in adolescents with Type 1 diabetes. Method: Adolescents aged 13-17 and diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes (n = 79) completed the Self-Report Behavioral Automaticity Index, a measure of automaticity of diabetes self-management (i.e., automaticity of glucose checking, carbohydrate counting, and insulin dosing), and a measure of perceived self-management at baseline. One to 3 months later, a subsample of teens (n = 42) also completed a daily diary for a 7-day period including perceptions of daily self-management, daily selfregulation failures in glucose checking, and daily glucose levels. Results: Greater overall automaticity of diabetes self-management was associated with greater baseline and daily self-management, fewer daily self-regulation failures in glucose checking, and lower average daily mean blood glucose levels but not more optimal daily variations in blood glucose levels. Conclusions: Greater automaticity for diabetes self-management may support more optimal daily diabetes self-management in adolescence. Further research is needed to clarify the benefits and mechanisms of automaticity and explore possible interventions.

In the context of economic games, adults sacrifice money to avoid unequal outcomes, showing so-called inequity aversion. Child-friendly adaptations of these games have shown that children, too, show inequity aversion. Moreover, inequity aversion shows a clear developmental trajectory, with young children rejecting only disadvantageously unequal distributions and older children rejecting both disadvantageously and advantageously unequal distributions. However, based on existing work, it is difficult to compare adult and child responses to inequity because (1) adapting economic games to make them child-friendly may importantly alter the dynamics of the fairness interaction and (2) adult work typically uses abstract rewards such as money while work with children typically uses more concrete rewards like candy, stickers or toys. Here we adapted the Inequity Game—a paradigm designed to study children’s responses to inequality in isolation from other concerns—to test inequity aversion in adults (N = 104 pairs). We manipulated whether participants made decisions about concrete rewards (candy) or abstract rewards (tokens that could be traded in for money). We found that, like children, adults rejected unequal payoffs in this task. Additionally, we found that reward type mattered: adults rejected disadvantageous—but not advantageous—monetary distributions, yet rejected both disadvantageous and advantageous candy distributions. These findings allow us to draw clearer comparisons across child and adult responses to unfairness and help paint a fuller picture of inequity aversion in humans.

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