This study examined the influence of personality information on perceptions of the physical attractiveness of a range of female body sizes. A sample of 2,157 male university students were randomly assigned to one of 10 groups in which they received personality information about women they were rating, or a control group in which they received no personality information. Controlling for participants' age and body mass index, results showed no significant between-group differences in the body size that participants found most attractive. However, participants provided with positive personality information perceived a wider range of body sizes as physically attractive compared with the control group, whereas participants provided with negative personality information perceived a narrower range of body sizes as attractive. Correlations showed that participants' own Extraversion was associated with their body size ratings. These results suggest that non-physical cues have an influence on the perception of physical beauty.

Research has shown that the low-activity MAOA genotype in conjunction with a history of childhood maltreatment increases the likelihood of violent behaviors. This genetic-environment (G × E) interaction has been introduced as mitigation during the sentencing phase of capital trials, yet there is scant data on its effectiveness. This study addressed that issue. In a factorial design that varied mitigating evidence offered by the defense [environmental (i.e., childhood maltreatment), genetic, G × E, or none] and the likelihood of the defendant's future dangerousness (low or high), 600 mock jurors read sentencing phase evidence in a capital murder trial, rendered individual verdicts, and half deliberated as members of a jury to decide a sentence of death or life imprisonment. The G × E evidence had little mitigating effect on sentencing preferences: participants who received the G × E evidence were no less likely to sentence the defendant to death than those who received evidence of childhood maltreatment or a control group that received neither genetic nor maltreatment evidence. Participants with evidence of a G × E interaction were more likely to sentence the defendant to death when there was a high risk of future dangerousness than when there was a low risk. Sentencing preferences were more lenient after deliberation than before. We discuss limitations and future directions.

Criminal responsibility in the American legal system requires the presence of an actus reus-a harmful act that was committed voluntarily-and a mens rea, or guilty mind. Courts frequently consider questions surrounding mens rea but rarely question whether an act was committed voluntarily. Thus, courts presume that acts have been committed voluntarily and with an ill will; retribution, which serves the primary basis for punishment in the USA, relies on this presumption. Research in neuroscience and the behavioral sciences, however, suggests that this presumption is flawed and not sufficiently robust to justify punishment that is grounded in retribution. In this paper we discuss the presumption of voluntariness and free will inherent in the law, provide examples of how the courts have conflated actus reus and mens rea and the consequences of doing so, and the implications of neuroscience and behavioral science research for actus reus (also known as the voluntary act requirement). Finally, we propose re-conceptualizing punishment within a consequentialist, empirically-based framework that does not rely on folk psychological notions about human behavior and reinvigorates the actus reus as the foundational requirement for legal responsibility.