АннотацияОстрота проблемы недоинвестирования в специфические активы, так же как и выгоды от применения вертикальных ограничивающих соглашений (ВОС), являющихся инструмен-том ее преодоления, во многом определяются тем, какой характер носят специфические инвестиции. В современной теории фирмы всё большее внимание уделяется проблеме поддержания стимулов к осуществлению так называемых кооперативных специфических инвестиций, которые существенно превосходят по степени рискованности эгоистические специфические инвестиции, подобные рассмотренным в модели О. Харта . Это обусловлено тем, что при разрыве отношений между партнерами выигрыш от кооператив-ных инвестиций получает не сама инвестирующая сторона, а ее партнер. Однако существующие нормативные документы, регламентирующие процедуру сопостав-ления про-и контрконкурентных последствий заключения ВОС в соответствии с правилом «взвешенного подхода», не предполагают учета характера специфических инвестиций. В ре-зультате при проведении оценки правомерности применения ВОС методом «взвешенного подхода» возникают серьезные проблемы, осложняющие антимонопольные разбиратель-ства. Ярким примером может служить ход судебного процесса в отношении французской компании Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS (PFDC) * , продолжавшегося в течение семи лет (с 2006-го по 2013 год). В статье содержится детальный анализ этого дела, а также сфор-мулирован ряд рекомендаций по оценке правомерности ВОС в соответствии с правилом «взвешенного подхода», которые позволяют учесть характер специфических инвестиций. Ключевые слова: кооперативные специфические инвестиции, вертикальные ограничива-ющие соглашения, взвешенный подход, селективная дистрибьюция, антитраст, интернет-торговля. JEL: B52, E22, G11, K21. Антимонопольная политикаАгамирова Мария Евгеньевна -кандидат экономических наук, старший преподаватель.

The article examines the interpretation of vertical restraints in Chicago, post-Chicago and New Institutional Economics approaches, as well as the reflection of these approaches in the application of antitrust laws. The main difference between neoclassical and new institutional analysis of vertical restraints is that the former compares the results of their use with market organization outcomes, and assesses mainly horizontal effects, while the latter focuses on the analysis of vertical effects, comparing the results of vertical restraints application with hierarchical organization. Accordingly, the evaluation of vertical restraints impact on competition differs radically. The approach of the New Institutional Theory of the firm seems fruitful for Russian markets.

The article discusses the recent practical results of vertical restraints regulation in Russia. Despite of the apparent similarity of Russian and EU vertical restraints regulation, the practical results of their application differ. The reason is the continuing confusion of horizontal and vertical agreements regulation and the prohibition of vertical restraints totally on the ground that they have anticompetitive consequences paying no attention to their positive effects. The antitrust regulation which prohibits «coordination of concerted practices» displaces other vertical restraints regulations. The article also argues against the growing practice of proscription of distribution systems through appointed dealers.

The article discusses the normative documents associated with the introduction of Russian regions’ heads key performance indicators (KPI). It draws attention to negative contract externalities intensively discussed in the economic literature of recent decades. Negative contract externalities accompanying the incentive contracts are typically associated with multitask moral hazard. They can serve as an explanation of KPI failure in many business firms. The results of KPI application in the sphere of public administration will inevitably become even more disappointing.

The paper discusses an alternative to vertical integration-the vertical restraints (VRs) which have been the subject of numerous studies in neo-institutional economics. It offers a new approach to analysis of vertical restraints as voluntary self-restraints in the situations of uncertainty. Not limited to consideration of uncertainty generated by market shocks (Rey and Tirole, 1986; Hansen and Motta, 2016), this approach takes into account possible termination of initial contract between firms at the ex post stage, i.e. when specific investments have been already made. Risks of contract termination are especially significant for so-called «cooperative» specific investments which might be defined as investments favorably affecting the outside options of opposite side, i.e. the investor's partner. Lotteries associated with cooperative specific investments are characterized by higher risk than lotteries associated with selfish specific investments (positively affecting the investor's outside options) because cooperative specific investments (unlike selfish specific investments) increase the risk of initial contract termination and often worsen the investor's outside options. Firms actively respond to risk of contract termination by choosing an under-investment strategy. The problem of underinvestment could be solved by an advance compensation paid by a supplier to retailers for taking risk associated with specific investments. Unfortunately, the implementation of this scenario is complicated by threat of double moral hazard. VRs voluntarily adopted by the supplier may be considered as substitutes to such compensation. They can increase the attractiveness of lotteries associated with specific investments by improving the retailer's probability beliefs or payoffs in uncertain outcomes: • VRs redistribute control in favor of the dealers reducing the uncertainty they face; • VRs may be interpreted as an element of the signaling activity aimed to convince the dealer of the supplier's willingness to continue cooperation at the ex post stage; • in case the supplier prefers to interrupt the business agreement with the dealer at the ex post stage, the VRs, such as exclusive territories, will ensure that the dealer gets at least partial compensation for contract termination; • and finally, VRs limit the possible redistribution of quasi-rent between the supplier and the dealer in the internal trade.