His research focuses on party systems, ideology, nostalgia, and corruption during transitions from authoritarian rule, and he is currently working on a book about Tunisia's party system after the 2010-11 uprising.On 25 July 2021, after a day of popular protests against the government, parliament, and largest Islamist party (Ennahdha), Tunisian president Kais Saied invoked Article 80 of the constitution, the emergency clause. Declaring the parliament and government existential threats to the state, he sacked Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi, froze parliament's activities for thirty days and stripped its members of immunity, and appointed himself head of the public prosecutor's office. At the end of the thirty days, during which Saied neither named a new prime minister nor agreed to discuss next steps, he extended the exceptional period indefinitely. On September 22, he announced the suspension of parts of the constitution and his assumption of the power to govern by decree.Saied claimed to be acting on behalf of "the people" to restore the promise of a revolution cut short by political elites, their "lobbies" of corruption, and the political parties they supposedly control. It is difficult to gauge precisely how many Tunisians find this argument compelling at a time when speaking out could result in house arrest or a travel ban. Nevertheless, Saied's move against the elected parliament appeared to enjoy broad popular support, at least initially-largely because ten years after ousting their former dictator, most Tunisians were still awaiting the prosperity and good government that democracy was supposed to deliver. And the institutions one might have expected to constrain the president-Ennahdha, the Nobel-prize winning Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), the country's robust civil society, and the international actors who have trumpeted the importance of Tunisia's