The aim of this paper is to show that Jevons’s utilitarianism is to be related to his attempt to build a mathematical theory of economics: the ‘felicific calculus’ provides the instrument for transforming sensations into quantities. The first section shows that Jevons referred to Bentham’s calculus but made it much simpler to enable the mathematical instrument to be introduced. The second section is devoted to his rejection of Mill’s attempt to make utilitarianism a morally reasonable philosophy by introducing qualities of feelings. But I endeavour to show that avoiding Mill’s interpretation did not mean that Jevons gave up on moral matters.

This paper aims at exploring, in a formal way, Bentham's statement that 'the pleasure of gaining is not equal to the evil of losing', which belongs to those aspects of the principle of utility left aside by Jevons' reconstruction. Consequently, the agent's preference order will be viewed as depending on his initial situation, and on asymmetric sensitivity to gains and losses, relative to this situation. This leads 1) to discuss the coexistence of multiple preference orders, illustrated by Bentham's analysis of the optimal labour contract; and 2) to introduce true deliberation as a consequence of the gap between positive choice and rival assessments of utility.Bentham Endogeneous Preferences Individual Utility Pain And Pleasure Preference Reversal Utilitarianism,

Be quiet », but keep cool : the role of the state in jeremy bentham's economic thought. This paper aims at showing that the tradition which uses to connect Bentham's utilitarianism with economie liberalism neglects the peculiarity of an approach for which economics is by no way autonomous to legislation. In this respect, we must underline the importance of information problems. Although they justify the non-intervention of the State, as long as we only consider the economie ends-« subsistence » and « abondance »-, they also lead to interventionist conclusions, each time a lack of information brings an uncertainty, threatening the end of « safety » and, more generally, the specifie ends of the « legislation ». Résumé « Be Quiet », mais modérément : Le rôle de l'État dans la pensée économique de Jeremy Bentham Cet article a pour objet de montrer que la tradition associant l'utilitarisme de Bentham au libéralisme économique conduit à négliger la singularité d'une approche dans laquelle la sphère économique ne peut être pensée comme autonome par rapport à la législation. L'accent est placé sur les problèmes d'information qui, s'ils justifient la non-ingérence de la puissance publique au regard des objectifs propres à l'économie-la « subsistance » et l'« abondance »-, conduisent également à des conclusions interventionnistes, chaque fois qu'une insuffisance d'information introduit une incertitude, mettant en danger le « bien de sûreté » et, plus généralement, les objectifs spécifiques de la « législation ».