Call path profiling associates resource consumption with the calling context in which resources were consumed. We describe the design and implementation of a low-overhead call path profiler based on stack sampling. The profiler uses a novel sample-driven strategy for collecting frequency counts for call graph edges without instrumenting every procedure's code to count them. The data structures and algorithms used are efficient enough to construct the complete calling context tree exposed during sampling. The profiler leverages information recorded by compilers for debugging or exception handling to record call path profiles even for highly-optimized code. We describe an implementation for the Tru64/Alpha platform. Experiments profiling the SPEC CPU2000 benchmark suite demonstrate the low (2%-7%) overhead of this profiler. A comparison with instrumentation-based profilers, such as gprof, shows that for call-intensive programs, our sampling-based strategy for call path profiling has over an order of magnitude lower overhead.

We present a new technique for identifying scalability bottlenecks in executions of single-program, multiple-data (SPMD) parallel programs, quantifying their impact on performance, and associating this information with the program source code. Our performance analysis strategy involves three steps. First, we collect call path profiles for two or more executions on different numbers of processors. Second, we use our expectations about how the performance of executions should differ, e.g., linear speedup for strong scaling or constant execution time for weak scaling, to automatically compute the scalability of costs incurred at each point in a program's execution. Third, with the aid of an interactive browser, an application developer can explore a program's performance in a top-down fashion, see the contexts in which poor scaling behavior arises, and understand exactly how much each scalability bottleneck dilates execution time. Our analysis technique is independent of the parallel programming model. We describe our experiences applying our technique to analyze parallel programs written in Co-array Fortran and Unified Parallel C, as well as message-passing programs based on MPI.

Firefox and other major browsers rely on dozens of third-party libraries to render audio, video, images, and other content. These libraries are a frequent source of vulnerabilities. To mitigate this threat, we are migrating Firefox to an architecture that isolates these libraries in lightweight sandboxes, dramatically reducing the impact of a compromise.Retrofitting isolation can be labor-intensive, very prone to security bugs, and requires critical attention to performance. To help, we developed RLBox, a framework that minimizes the burden of converting Firefox to securely and efficiently use untrusted code. To enable this, RLBox employs static information flow enforcement, and lightweight dynamic checks, expressed directly in the C++ type system.RLBox supports efficient sandboxing through either software-based-fault isolation or multi-core process isolation. Performance overheads are modest and transient, and have only minor impact on page latency. We demonstrate this by sandboxing performance-sensitive image decoding libraries (libjpeg and libpng), video decoding libraries (libtheora and libvpx), the libvorbis audio decoding library, and the zlib decompression library.RLBox, using a WebAssembly sandbox, has been integrated into production Firefox to sandbox the libGraphite font shaping library.