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Strong cognitivism about intention is the thesis that an intention to φ is a form of belief that one will φ. The thesis finds much intuitive resistance, such as from considerations about the nature, form, and form of expression of belief versus intention. Belief appears to be a doxastic attitude, propositional in form, and expressed by way of expressing that proposition; intention appears to be a practical attitude, not generally propositional in form, and not generally expressed by expressing a proposition. Unsurprisingly, and some noteworthy defenses notwithstanding, strong cognitivism about intention has not been a particularly popular view. 1 Marušić & Schwenkler 2 fn. offer an account and defense of strong cognitivism, which they regard as a best-explanation type of account. I show that their account and defense fail: while elegant and simple, they face distinctive problems, including a dilemma and a counterexample, which also undermine their claim to a best explanation.In Section 2, I briefly characterize Marušić & Schwenkler's account and defense of strong cognitivism, and offer some clarifications; in Section 3, I articulate objections, from the appearances, a resulting dilemma, and a type of counterexample. In Section 4, I continue to discuss and reject 1 See notably Velleman (1989. 2 Marušić & Schwenkler (2018), this journal (hereafter simply "Marušić & Schwenkler").

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