This paper analyzes yield spreads on sovereign debt issued by emerging markets using modern data from the 1990s and newly-collected historical data on debt traded in London during 1870-1913, a previous "golden era" for international capital market integration. Applying several empirical approaches, we show that the co-movement of spreads across emerging markets is higher today than it was in the historical sample. We also show that sharp changes in spreads today tend to be mostly related to global events, whereas countryspecific events played a bigger role in 1870-1913. Although we find some evidence that economic fundamentals, too, co-move more strongly today than at that earlier time, our interpretation of the results is that today's investors pay less attention to country-specific events than their predecessors did in 1870-1913.

We revisit the evidence on the relations between institutions, the cost of government debt, and financial development in Britain (1690–1790) and find that interest rates remained high and volatile for four decades after the Glorious Revolution, partly due to wars and instability; British interest rates co-moved with those in Holland; Debt per capita remained lower in Britain than in Holland until around 1780; and Britain did not borrow at lower rates than European countries with more limited protection of property rights. We conclude that, in the short run, institutional reforms are not rewarded by financial markets.

We investigate the effect of the establishment of modern institutions on the risk premium associated with Japanese government bonds traded in London between 1870 and 1914. While most institutional innovations failed to elicit an immediate market response, the adoption of the gold standard did significantly reduce the perceived risk associated with Japanese bonds. In addition, some geopolitical events, especially the military victory over Russia, improved Japan's debt capacity.

Historians of the period have generally played down the debasement of France's coinage to increase crown revenues during the Hundred Years' War or treated it as a last resort and an inept one. Based on archival data and an analytical framework drawn from the modern literature on inflation tax, this article supports challengers of that view, showing that debasement was an effective instrument of public finance.