We explore the foundations of the legislative party cartel, as theorized by Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005), to determine how majority‐party moderates who suffer net policy losses from the majority leadership's use of negative agenda control are kept from defecting from the cartel arrangement. First, we identify formally the group of majority‐party members who are net policy losers. We find that those members occupying the initial 30% of the space within the majority‐party blockout zone—that space closest to the floor median—are hurt on a pure policy basis by the cartel arrangement. Second, we find that members in this “30% zone” are rewarded disproportionately by majority‐party leaders (relative to members in other intervals on the same side of the floor median) via side payments in the form of campaign contributions. In addition, majority‐party members within the 30% zone receive side payments commensurate with their particular policy loss.

No abstract

We propose a typology for measuring agenda-setting success and failure in a legislative context. Our typology goes beyond the most commonly used measure ("rolls") and includes the full range of agenda-setting outcomes-rolls (opposing a proposal that subsequently passes), as well as "blocks" (opposing a proposal that is subsequently defeated), "successes" (supporting a proposal that subsequently passes), and "disappointments" (supporting a proposal that is subsequently defeated)-and thus takes into account instances of both positive and negative agenda power. We discuss these measures, and the theoretical questions surrounding them, with the hope of providing some guidance to scholars of the U.S. House, as well as those analyzing agenda power in other legislatures. As a first step in this direction, we explore variation in agenda-setting measures in 85 American state legislative chambersand Kanthak 2011; Jones and Hwang 2005). But if the agenda-setting institutions in these legislative bodies do not map well onto those in the U.S. House, the transition from theory to measure will suffer. Moreover, where theoretical innovation is sometimes hampered by the anticipation of measurement limitations, the over-focus on rolls as the measure of agenda control stunts the growth of agenda-setting theories beyond the U.S. House.In this article, we seek to loosen that restraint by proposing a typology for measuring legislative agenda-setting power. Our typology includes the full range of agenda-setting outcomes-rolls, as well as "blocks" (when an agenda setter opposes a proposal that is subsequently defeated), "successes" (when an agenda setter supports a proposal that subsequently passes), and "disappointments" (when an agenda setter

Using the change in party control of the Senate that resulted from Jim Jeffords's 2001 change in party affiliation, we compare competing partisan and partyless legislative theories. We offer a reconceptualization of agenda control that provides a new and promising basis for studying parties and policymaking in the Senate. Also, we present a novel methodology—an “event study”—to test partisan and partyless hypotheses. Our results show that, when Jeffords switched, the stock prices of Republican‐supported energy firms dropped and prices for Democrat‐supported firms rose, supporting the hypothesis that the majority party influences Senate decisions.

A fundamental tenet of partisan theories of legislative organization is that the majority party is able to generate outcomes that deviate in their preferred direction from the chamber median. While these biased outcomes may be achieved through arm twisting on final passage votes, there is a more efficient means for achieving this bias: restrictive rules. While scholars have recognized this tactic as an important leadership tool in the House, its effectiveness has been often assumed but never empirically tested. We develop a theoretical model that demonstrates how the majority party can use restrictive rules to offer successful ''take-it-or-leave-it'' proposals to the floor median. More significantly, we test this model using DW-NOMINATE's estimated cut points of final passage roll calls in the House from the 101 st to 108 th Congress. Our results support the prediction of our model and suggest that majority party leaders achieve biased policy outcomes through the use of restrictive rules. Mr. Speaker, this is a sad day for the United States House of Representatives. This rule, quite frankly, is an insult to every single Member of this body. This rule should be open, and instead this rule is typically restrictive. This rule should be defeated. The underlying bill, contrary to what you have heard here today, is not a reflection of bipartisan deliberation, because the truth is that deliberation is all but dead in this House. .. I would say to my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, if you want to show some bipartisanship, if you want to promote a process that has some integrity, this should be an open rule.-Rep. James P. McGovern (D-Massachusetts) Congressional Record, H1877,