In many applications, it is of interest to identify anomalous behavior within a dynamic interacting system. Such anomalous interactions are reflected by structural changes in the network representation of the system. We propose and investigate the use of the degree corrected stochastic block model (DCSBM) to model and monitor dynamic networks that undergo a significant structural change. We apply statistical process monitoring techniques to the estimated parameters of the DCSBM to identify significant structural changes in the network. We apply our surveillance strategy to a dynamic US Senate covoting network. We detect significant changes in the political network that reflect both times of cohesion and times of polarization among Republican and Democratic party members. Our analysis demonstrates that the DCSBM monitoring procedure effectively detects local and global structural changes in complex networks, providing useful insights into the modeled system. The DCSBM approach is an example of a general framework that combines parametric random graph models and statistical process monitoring techniques for network surveillance.

The comparison of two measurement systems is important in medical and other contexts. A common goal is to decide if a new measurement system agrees suitably with an existing one, and hence whether the two can be used interchangeably. Various methods for assessing interchangeability are available, the most popular being the limits of agreement approach due to Bland and Altman. In this article, we review the challenges of this technique and propose a model-based framework for comparing measurement systems that overcomes those challenges. The proposal is based on a simple metric, the probability of agreement, and a corresponding plot which can be used to summarize the agreement between two measurement systems. We also make recommendations for a study design that facilitates accurate and precise estimation of the probability of agreement.

Background: Studies of agreement examine the distance between readings made by different devices or observers measuring the same quantity. If the values generated by each device are close together most of the time then we conclude that the devices agree. Several different agreement methods have been described in the literature, in the linear mixed modelling framework, for use when there are time-matched repeated measurements within subjects. Methods: We provide a tutorial to help guide practitioners when choosing among different methods of assessing agreement based on a linear mixed model assumption. We illustrate the use of five methods in a head-to-head comparison using real data from a study involving Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) patients and matched repeated respiratory rate observations. The methods used were the concordance correlation coefficient, limits of agreement, total deviation index, coverage probability, and coefficient of individual agreement. Results: The five methods generated similar conclusions about the agreement between devices in the COPD example; however, some methods emphasized different aspects of the between-device comparison, and the interpretation was clearer for some methods compared to others. Conclusions: Five different methods used to assess agreement have been compared in the same setting to facilitate understanding and encourage the use of multiple agreement methods in practice. Although there are similarities between the methods, each method has its own strengths and weaknesses which are important for researchers to be aware of. We suggest that researchers consider using the coverage probability method alongside a graphical display of the raw data in method comparison studies. In the case of disagreement between devices, it is important to look beyond the overall summary agreement indices and consider the underlying causes. Summarising the data graphically and examining model parameters can both help with this.

The term network surveillance is defined in general terms and illustrated with many examples. Statistical methodologies that can be used as tools for network surveillance are discussed. Details for 3 illustrative examples that address network security, surveillance for data network failures, and surveillance of email traffic flows are presented. Some open areas of research are identified.

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