No abstract

In this paper, we present two differential fault analyses on PRESENT-80 which is a lightweight block cipher. The first attack is a basic attack which induces a fault on only one bit of intermediate states, and we can obtain the last subkey of the block cipher, given 48 faulty cipher texts on average. The second attack can retrieve the master key of the block cipher, given 18 faulty cipher texts on average. In the latter attack, we assume that we can induce faults on a single nibble of intermediate states. Given those faulty cipher texts, the computational complexity of attacks is negligible.

The new block cipher PRINTCIPHER was introduced in CHES 2010 as a lightweight block cipher for 'integrated circuit' or IC-'printing' technology. The key of PRINTCIPHER consist of two sub-key components where the first sub-key is 'XORed' to the state in each round, whereas the second sub-key is used to generate the key-dependent permutations. In this study, the authors describe a new differential fault analysis on the lightweight block cipher PRINTCIPHER. The authors present two different fault models for obtaining each sub-key. The first fault model is used to obtain the second sub-key, which induces a fault on the key-dependent permutation layer so, on average, key search space is reduced from 2 32 to 2 14 , given 36 faulty cipher texts. To obtain the first sub-key, the authors induce a fault on an intermediate results then they obtain, on average, 42 bits of the first sub-key with less than 24 faulty cipher texts. In total, on average, they reduce key search space of PRINTCIPHER from 2 80 to 2 20 , given 60 faulty cipher texts. They also simulated their attack on a 1.8 GHz Celeron PC.