Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of board characteristics on MFIs performance in Nigeria. A specific country study is warranted given the results from pooled cross-country studies may be biased owing to a failure to control for country differences. It is also particularly challenging to generalize the outcome of these results into a specific country given that many factors about MFIs, ranging from the nature of governance, legal status, size and prudential regulations, are not similar across countries. Design/methodology/approach The relationship between board characteristics and microfinance banks performance in Nigeria is tested using a sample of 120 firm-year observations covering 30 MFIs in the periods from 2010 to 2013. The study extracted all microfinance-level data from the Microfinance Information Exchange database. Findings The authors document a positive and significant relationship between board size and MFIs performance. The authors also find negative relation between female directors and MFIs performance, but not significant. The results suggest that larger board size indicates good corporate governance practice, which leads to reduced agency cost. Research limitations/implications This study sheds new lights on the Nigerian MFIs’ board room dynamic. As the government is increasingly contemplating on the board structure and corporate governance policies, the study offers useful and timely empirical guidance to the Nigerian regulators. Originality/value Given the important role of microfinance industry in Nigeria, this is the first study of its kind analyzing the impact of board characteristics on microfinance performance among Nigerian MFIs.

Islamic financing instruments can be categorised into profit and loss/risk sharing and non-participatory instruments. Although profit and loss sharing instruments such as musharakah are widely accepted as the ideal form of Islamic financing, prior studies suggest that alternative instruments such as murabahah are preferred by Islamic banks. Nevertheless, prior studies did not explore factors that influence the use of Islamic financing among non-financial firms. Our study fills this gap and contributes new knowledge in several ways. First, we find no evidence of widespread use of Islamic financing instruments across non-financial firms. This is because the instruments are mostly used by less profitable firms with higher leverage (i.e. risky firms). Second, we find that profit and loss sharing instruments are hardly used, whilst the use of murabahah is dominant. Consistent with the prediction of moral-hazard-risk avoidance theory, further analysis suggests that users with a lower asset base (to serve as collateral) are associated with murabahah financing. Third, we present a critical discourse on the contentious nature of murabahah as practised. The economic significance and ethical issues associated with murabahah as practised should trigger serious efforts to steer Islamic corporate financing towards risk-sharing more than the controversial rent-seeking practice.

No abstract

This study examines whether and how CEO equity incentives relate to financing choices (i.e., debt and leases). Using manually collected CEO compensation and lease data for a sample of large UK firms, we found evidence of a negative relationship between CEO equity incentives and firm leverage. We also found that CEO equity incentives and leases are negatively related. The results are consistent with the theory introduced in this study on the substitutability of executive compensation and firm's debt/lease financing. Our findings represent fresh empirical evidence and renewed interpretation regarding the relationship between executive equity-based incentives and firm's financing choices. The substitutability theory we introduced here suggests that firms with greater use of debt and/or leases will implement less equity-based compensation in mitigating the agency cost of equity.JEL classification: G32, G34, J33, M52

No abstract