Most research on adolescent risk‐taking has been conducted in Western societies, but it is as yet unknown whether motives to engage in risk behaviours show cultural variety. This study sets out to investigate differences in perceived motives to engage in perceived risks in Turkish and Welsh samples of young people (N=922) between 14 and 20 years of age. For this, a measurement scale to assess motives for risk‐taking was constructed and validated cross‐culturally. The scale was based on Kloep and Hendry's [(1999). Challenges, risks and coping in adolescence. In D. Messer, & S. Millar (Eds.), Exploring developmental psychology (pp. 400–416). London: Arnold] theoretical framework and the results of a study by Güney and Çok [(2006). Adolescent risk‐taking: Calculated risks, Turkish experience. In Paper presented at the 10th Bi‐annual conference of the European Association for Research on Adolescence, Antalya, Turkey]. Results show that different motives are associated with different risk behaviours, confirming Kloep and Hendry's expanded model. There were small, but significant, national differences, implying that motives to take risks—as opposed to actual risks taken—could be similar across adolescent populations, independent of culture.

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gestellt. Keinesfalls führt die Wählbarkeit nichtstaatlichen Rechts dazu, dass das optionale Instrument des europäischen Vertragsrechts obsolet geworden wäre. Obwohl bereits Regelwerke wie die PECL, PICC oder unter Umständen auch Texte der Study Group on a European Civil Code gewählt werden können, besteht immer noch die Notwendigkeit eines Gemeinschaftsinstruments wie im Aktionsplan vorgestellt. SummaryCompared to the Rome Convention the proposal for a Rome I regulation has brought a remarkable improvement by expressly allowing not only the choice of law enacted as state law but of non-state bodies of law as well. Alone this clarification should be seen as an advantage of the proposal. However, vagueness still arises from the requirements of art. 3 (2) of the proposal. This is because international recognition respectively recognition in the Community is very difficult to determine. It can not be expected that there will be agreement on the correct criteria for this determination. In general, not too strict a standard is to be applied for otherwise the development of established and the acknowledgement of new set of rules would be unnecessarily complicated. But a further development in that field could have a positive impact on a future optional Community instrument. With regard to such an optional instrument, art. 3 (2) of the proposal has in any case initiated an opting-in solution. Despite the possibility to choose a non-state body of law as applicable law to a contract, an optional Community instrument would not be useless; although the parties can choose sets of rules like the PICC, PECL or probably even texts of the Study Group of a European Civil Code, the optional instrument is still necessary for European contract law. RØsumØLe projet de rglement Rome I a apportØ un net progrs par rapport au EVÜ avec la possibilitØ de choisir comme statut conventionnel un droit non Øtatique. MÞme ceux qui critiquent cette solution doivent au moins voir un avantage dans cet Øclaircissement. Toutefois, les ØlØments de l'article 3 alinØa 2 du projet de rglement Rome I soulvent un nouveau problme, Øtant donnØ que la reconnaissance exigØe des rgles et principes choisis à un niveau international et communautaire est extrÞmement difficile à dØterminer. En ce qui concerne les critres à Øtablir, il ne rgne que trs peu d'accord. Fondamentalement, un critre libØral devrait Þtre posØ afin de ne pas empÞcher la diffusion et le dØveloppement de diffØrents ensembles de dispositions. Un perfectionnement des ensembles de dispositions, dØjà Øtablis ou nouveaux, serait positif pour un instrument Øligible du droit europØen des contrats. En ce qui concerne un tel instrument communautaire, l'article 3 alinØa 2 du projet de rglement Rome I a dØjà prØparØ le terrain pour une solution « opt-in ». En aucun cas, l'ØligibilitØ d'un droit non Øtatique ne conduit à ce que l'instrument optionnel du droit europØen des contrats ne devienne obsolte. Bien que des ensembles de dispositions tels que les PECL, les PICC, ou dans certaines circonstances le te...