No abstract

Revenue volatility hinders the planning within nonprofit organizations, and as a consequence, it can influence the organization’s contribution to public welfare. To analyze the extent of revenue volatility and its determinants, this paper uses a comprehensive, longitudinal, data set of German nonprofit sports clubs ( n = 724). It distinguishes between systematic volatility and club-specific volatility, and argues that a complete understanding of the sources and impacts of volatility requires one to clearly distinguish between the two components. Empirical results indicate that revenue diversification can significantly reduce club-specific volatility, but has more minimal benefits for lowering systematic volatility. It also reveals that clubs that rely more heavily on membership fees, and less on subsidies, appear to have reduced levels of systematic and club-specific volatility, with the impact being much greater for the latter.

No abstract

Using a comprehensive data set covering the entire modern era of the National Hockey League (NHL), this article finds evidence that French Canadians have been underrepresented on English Canadian NHL teams, relative to their representation on U.S.-based teams. This underrepresentation on English Canadian teams was found not only for French Canadian players but also for off-ice personnel such as general managers and coaches. None of the traditional arguments as to why French Canadians may face entry barriers in the NHL can adequately explain the results of this article. The findings of the article give support to the hypothesis that French-English tensions may be resulting in English Canadian teams discriminating against French Canadian players. This hypothesis is given more credence when it is found that the degree of underrepresentation of French Canadians is greater during those NHL seasons when sovereigntist political threats in Quebec are highest.

This article argues that in legislative systems where absolute party discipline is present, the only means by which a legislator can dissent from the party position is to abstain from voting. It is argued that abstentions are more likely to occur where the party‐imposed position causes conflict for the legislator—either because the party‐imposed position conflicts with the interests of the legislator's constituents or because it conflicts with the legislator's personal ideology. The hypothesis is empirically tested by examining voting in the Canadian House of Commons on the bill to implement the politically controversial Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement. The empirical results lend general support to the theoretical notions. (JEL D70, D72)